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Conformity and Dissent 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Much of the time, human beings do what others do. This is perfectly sensible, because the 
actions and statements of other people convey valuable information about what should be 
done. In addition, most people want the good opinion of others, and this desire promotes 
conformity. But conformity can lead both groups and institutions in unfortunate and 
even catastrophic directions. The most serious problem is that by following others, people 
fail to disclose what they know and believe, thus depriving society of important 
information. Those who dissent, and who reject the pressures imposed by others, perform 
valuable social functions, often at their own expense, material or nonmaterial. These 
points are illustrated by reference to theoretical and empirical work on conformity, 
cascades, and group polarization.  An understanding of the role of conformity and dissent 
casts new light on a variety of legal issues, including the expressive function of law; the 
institutions of the American constitution; the functions of free speech in wartime; the 
debate over the composition of the federal judiciary; and affirmative action in higher 
education. 
 
 
 “If I were to choose between living in a society which enjoys freedom of 
expression, but not having the right myself, or enjoying the right in a society 
which does not have it, I would have no hesitation in judging that my own 
personal interest is better served by the first option.”1 
 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and 
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. For valuable comments, I am grateful to 
Jacob Gersen, Reid Hastie, David Hirshleifer, Christine Jolls, Catharine MacKinnon, Martha 
Nussbaum, Susan Moller Okin, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Lior Strahilevitz, Adrian Vermeule, 
and Richard Zeckhauser.  
1 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 39 (1994). 
 
  “As soon as a person is in the midst of a group he is no longer indifferent 
to it. He may stand in a wholly unequivocal relation to an object when alone; but 
as soon as a group and its direction are present he ceases to be determined solely 
by his own coordinates. In some way he refers the group to himself and himself 
to the group. He might react to the group in many different ways; he might 
adopt its direction, compromise with it, or oppose it; he might even decide to 
disregard it. But even in the latter instance (which superficially seems to be an 
‘absence of group influence’) there is a clear and determined reference to the 
group as fully as in the preceding cases.”2 
 
“Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. . . . His was the mouth of 
a man who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. . . . I have 
been perhaps most personally affected by Justice Marshall as a raconteur . . . . 
Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still catch myself looking expectantly for 
his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just once more, another 
story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.”3 
 
“A child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as 
his eyes showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The Emperor is naked,’ he 
said.”4 
 
“[W]hile individual ideology and panel composition both have important 
effects on a judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a better predictor of 
one’s vote than one’s own ideology.”5 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
How do people influence each other? What are the social functions of 
dissenters, malcontents, and skeptics? How do the answers to these questions 
bear on law and policy, and on the design of private and public institutions?  
 
Consider some clues: 
                                                 
2 Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 483 (1952). 
3 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 
1217, 1217, 1220 (1992). 
4 See Hans Christian Anderson, The Emperor’s New Suit, in Hans Christian Anderson, Shorter 
Tales (Jean Hersholt trans. 1948; originally published 1837). 
5 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717, 
1764 (1997). 
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—A large number of judicial votes and decisions were investigated to see 
if it matters whether a panel, on a federal court of appeals, includes two judges, 
or instead three, appointed by a President of the same party.6 It is tempting to 
suggest that this should not matter at all; two judges, after all, are able to 
produce a majority decision. But this suggestion turns out to be wrong. A panel 
with three judges appointed by Republican presidents is much more likely than a 
panel with two to reverse an environmental decision at the behest of an industry 
challenger.7 A group of three like-minded judges behaves very differently from a 
group with more diverse views. No less remarkably, a single Democratic judge, 
sitting with two Republicans, turns out to be more likely to vote in favor of an 
industry challenge to a regulation than a single Republican, sitting with two 
Democrats.8 It is not entirely wrong to conclude that when sitting with 
Republicans, Democratic judges vote like Republicans, and that when sitting 
with Democrats, Republican judges vote like Democrats. But this conclusion is 
itself misleading, because how Democrats vote, and how Republicans vote, is 
very much dependent on whether they are sitting with one or two judges 
appointed by presidents of the same party.9  
 
—Ordinary citizens were asked to say, as individuals, how much a 
defendant should be punished for specified misconduct.10 Their responses were 
measured on a scale of 0 to 8, where 0 meant no punishment at all and 8 meant 
“extremely severe” punishment.11 After recording their individual judgments, 
people were sorted into six-person juries, which were asked to deliberate and to 
reach unanimous verdicts. When the individual jurors favored little punishment, 
the group showed a "leniency shift," meaning a rating that was systematically 
lower than the median rating of individual members before they started to talk 
                                                 
6 The statements in this paragraph are based on my independent research, presented below, and 
on Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717, 
1755 (1997). To the same effect, see Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107 Yale LJ 2155 (1998) (finding that a panel of three Republican 
judges is far more likely to reject agency action, in order to reach a conclusion that would be 
predicted of that panel on political grounds, than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat). 
7 See the data discussed below; see also Revesz, supra note, at 1754-55 (also finding that a panel of 
three judges appointed by the president of the same party behaves differently from a panel with 
judges appointed by presidents of different parties) . 
8 See id. at 1752. 
9 Id. at 1752, 1754. 
10 See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars, 100 
Colum L Rev 1139 (2001). 
11 Id. at 1150. 
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 with one another.12 But when individual jurors favored strong punishment, the 
group as a whole produced a "severity shift," meaning a rating that was 
systematically higher than the median rating of individual members before they 
started to talk.13 The direction and the extent of the shift were determined by the 
median ranking of individual jurors, and because one or two dissenters from the 
majority view could shift the median, they could make a significant difference. 
 
My principal claim in this Article is that for each of us, conformity is often 
a rational course of action, but when all or most of us conform, society can end 
up making large mistakes. One reason we conform is that we often lack much 
information of our own, and the decisions of others provide the best available 
information about what should be done.14 The central problem is that 
widespread conformity deprives the public of information that it needs to have. 
Conformists are often thought to be protective of social interests, keeping quiet 
for the sake of the group, while dissenters tend to be seen as selfish 
individualists, embarking on projects of their own. But in an important sense, the 
opposite is closer to the truth. In many situations, dissenters benefit others, while 
conformists benefit themselves.  
 
In a well-functioning democracy, institutions reduce the risks that 
accompany conformity, in part because they meet conformity with dissent, and 
hence increase the likelihood that more information will emerge, to the benefit of 
all. A high-level official during World War II attributed the successes of the 
Allies, and the failures of Hitler and the other Axis powers, to the greater ability 
of citizens in democracies to scrutinize and dissent, and hence to improve past 
and proposed courses of action.15 Dissent and scrutiny were possible because 
skeptics were not punished by the law and because informal punishments, in the 
form of social pressures, were relatively weak. I will suggest that an 
understanding of group influences, and their potentially harmful effects, casts 
new light on a wide range of issues, including the nature of the American 
                                                 
12 Id. at 1152, 1154-55. 
13 Id.  
14 See the discussion of imitation as a fast and frugal heuristic in Joseph Henrich et al., What Is the 
Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality, in Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 343, 344 
(Gerd Gigerenzer and Richard Selten eds. 2002) (“Cultural transmission capacities allow 
individuals to shortcut the costs of search, experimentation, and data processing algorithms, and 
instead benefit from the cumulative experience stored in the minds (and observed in the 
behavior) of others.”). 
15 See Luther Gulick, Administrative Reflections from World War II (1948). Irving Janis, 
Groupthink (2d ed. 1985), can be seen as a generalization of this theme. 
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 constitutional structure; the functions of bicameralism; the sources of ethnic 
hostility and political radicalism; the importance of civil liberties in wartime and 
during social panics and witch-hunts; the performance of juries; the effects of 
diversity on the federal judiciary; affirmative action in higher education; and the 
potentially large consequences of law even when it is never enforced.  
 
Throughout I focus on two influences on individual belief and behavior. 
The first involves the information conveyed by the actions and statements of 
other people. If a number of people seem to believe that some proposition is true, 
there is reason to believe that that proposition is in fact true. Most of what we 
think—about facts, morality, and law—is a product not of first-hand knowledge, 
but of what we learn from what others do and think. This is true even though 
they too may be merely following the crowd. As we shall see, this phenomenon 
can create serious problems for the system of precedent, as when courts of 
appeals follow previous courts that are in turn following their predecessors, 
creating a danger of widespread, self-perpetuating error. And of course some 
people have more influence than others, simply because the decisions of those 
people convey more information; we are especially likely to follow those who 
have special expertise, those who seem most like us, those who fare best, or those 
whom we otherwise have reason to trust.16 
 
The second influence is the pervasive human desire to have and to retain 
the good opinion of others. If a number of people seem to believe something, 
there is reason not to disagree with them, at least not in public. The desire to 
maintain the good opinion of others breeds conformity and squelches dissent, 
especially but not only in groups that are connected by bonds of affection, which 
can therefore impair group performance. We shall see that close-knit groups, 
discouraging conflict and disagreement, often do badly for that very reason. In 
any case much of human behavior is a product of social influences. For example, 
employees are far more likely to file suit if members of the same workgroup have 
also done so17; teenage girls who see that other teenagers are having children are 
more likely to become pregnant themselves18; the perceived behavior of others 
                                                 
16 See Daniel Goldstein et al., Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work?, in Bounded 
Rationality, note supra, at 174–76; Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, Norms and Bounded 
Rationality, in id. at 284–87. 
17 See Harold H. Gardner, Nathan L. Kleinman, and Richard J. Butler, Workers’ Compensation 
and Family and Medical Leave Act Claim Contagion, 20 J Risk and Uncertainty 89, 101–110 (2000) 
18 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock 
Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. Econ. 277 (1996). 
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 has a large effect on the level of violent crime19; broadcasters mimic one another, 
producing otherwise inexplicable fads in programming20; lower courts 
sometimes do the same, especially in highly technical areas, and hence judicial 
mistakes may never be corrected.21 
 
We should not lament social influences or wish them away. Much of the 
time, people do better when they take close account of what others do. Some of 
the time, we even do best to follow others blindly. But social influences also 
diminish the total level of information within any group, and they threaten, 
much of the time, to lead individuals and institutions in the wrong directions. 
Dissent can be an important corrective; many groups and institutions have too 
little of it.22 As we shall see, conformists are free-riders, whereas dissenters often 
confer benefits on others; and it is tempting to free-ride. As we shall also see, 
social pressures are likely to lead groups of like-minded people to extreme 
positions. When groups become caught up in hatred and violence, it is rarely 
because of economic deprivation23 or primordial suspicions24; it is far more often 
a product of the informational and reputational influences discussed here.25 
Indeed, unjustified extremism frequently results from a “crippled epistemology,” 
in which extremists react to a small subset of relevant information, coming 
mostly from one another.26  
 
                                                 
19 See Edward Glaeser, E. Sacerdote, and Jose Scheinkman, Crime and Social Interactions, 111 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 507 (1996). 
20 See Robert Kennedy, Strategy Fads and Strategic Positioning: An Empirical Test for Herd 
Behavior in Prime-Time Television Programming, J. Industrial Economics (2002). 
21 See Andrew F. Daughtety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment, 1 Am Law and 
Ec. Rev. 158 (1999). 
22 Hence Mill’s claim that “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is 
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the 
opinion, stil more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, 
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” John 
Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on 
Representative Government 85 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972) 
23 See Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: 
Is There a Causal Connection? (unpublished manuscript 2002).  
24 See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 
J Legal Stud 623, 648 (1998). 
25 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 Harv J Law and 
Public Policy 429 (2002). 
26 See Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism, in Political Rationality and 
Extremism 3, 16 (Albert Breton et al. eds. 2002). 
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 Similar processes occur in less dramatic forms. Many large-scale shifts 
within legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts are best explained by reference to 
social influences. When a legislature suddenly shows concern with some 
formerly neglected problem—for example, hazardous waste dumps or corporate 
misconduct—the concern is often a product of conformity effects, not of real 
engagement with the problem. Of course the new concern might be justified. But 
if social influences are encouraging people to conceal information that they have, 
or if the blind are leading the blind, serious problems are likely. There is a further 
point. With relatively small "shocks," similar groups can be lead, by social 
pressures, to dramatically different beliefs and actions. When societies differ, or 
when large-scale changes occur over time, the reason often lies not where we 
usually look, but in small and sometimes elusive factors.27  
  
An appreciation of informational influences, and of people’s concern for 
the good opinion of others, helps to show how, and when, law can alter behavior 
without being enforced—and merely by virtue of the signal that it provides.28 
The central point here is that law can provide reliable evidence both about what 
should be done and about what most people think should be done. In either case, 
it can convey a great deal of relevant information.29 Consider bans on public 
smoking and on sexual harassment. If people think that the law is speaking for 
the view of most or all, potential violators are less likely to engage in smoke or to 
engage in sexual harassment. Potential victims are also more likely to take the 
steps to enforce the law privately, as, for example, through reminding people of 
their legal responsibilities, and insisting that violators come into compliance. In 
this light we can better understand the much-disputed claim that the law has an 
“expressive function.”30 By virtue of that function, law can even stop or 
                                                 
27 See Joseph Henrich, What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in Bounded 
Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 353-54 (2001), for an entertaining outline in connection with 
food choice decisions. For example: “Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating 
cherries is deadly; they also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, 
however, rather enjoy a cold drink of water after some cherries; and Americans love icy 
refreshments. ” Id. at 353. See also Paul Omerod, Butterfly Economics (1993), for a popular 
account. 
28 See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, 
in Smoking Policy (Robert Rabin and Stephen Sugarman eds.) (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
29 See Richard McAdams, Norms Theory: An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Oregon L. 
Rev. 339 (2000). 
30 Mathew Adler, Expressivist Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U Pa L Rev 1363 
(2000); Symposium, The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action: Philosophical and Legal 
Perspectives, 60 Maryland L. Rev. 465 (2001). 
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 accelerate a social cascade.31 Here too the areas of cigarette smoking and sexual 
harassment are relevant examples. But if would-be violators are part of a 
dissident subcommunity, they might well be able to resist law’s expressive effect; 
fellow dissidents can band together and encourage one another to violate the 
law. Indeed, informational and reputational factors can even encourage 
widespread noncompliance, as, for example, in drug use and failure to comply 
with the tax laws.32 The law’s expressive power is partly a function of its moral 
authority, and when law lacks that authority within a subcommunity, its signal 
may be irrelevant or even counterproductive. 
 
This Article is divided into seven parts. Parts II, III, and IV investigate 
social science evidence involving, respectively, conformity, cascades, and group 
polarization. A unifying theme is that in all three contexts, individuals are 
suppressing their private signals—about what is true and what is right—and that 
this suppression can cause significant social harm. Groups of like-minded people 
are especially vulnerable on this count. Part V focuses on the expressive function 
of law and in particular on the phenomenon of “compliance without 
enforcement.” Part VI catalogues some implications of social influences for 
constitutionalism, judicial confirmations, and affirmative action in higher 
education. Here I urge that the principal contribution of the framers of the 
American Constitution lay not in their endorsement of deliberative democracy, 
but in their insistence that diversity is an affirmative good, likely to improve 
deliberation. This enthusiasm for diversity helps account for the systems of 
checks and balances and federalism. I also suggest that it is important to attempt 
to provide a mix of views on the federal bench; indeed, consideration should be 
given to increasing the likelihood that panels, on courts of appeals, contain 
judges appointed by president of different parties. I urge as well that in those 
cases in which racial diversity will improve discussion, it is entirely legitimate 
for colleges and universities to attempt to promote racial diversity. Part VII is a 
brief conclusion. 
 
II. Conformity and Independence 
 
Why, and when, do people do what others do? To answer this question, 
we need to distinguish between hard questions and easy ones. Intuition suggests 
                                                 
31 See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. Chi. 
L. Rev 607 (2000). 
32 See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, in Banning Smoking: Compliance Without 
Enforcement, in Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and Culture 78 (Robert Radin ed. 1999). 
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 that when people are confident that they are right, they will be more willing to 
do what they think best and to reject the views of the crowd. Several sets of 
experiments confirm this intuition, but they also offer some significant twists. 
Most important, they suggest three points that I will emphasize throughout: 
 
1. Those who are confident and firm will have particular influence, and can lead 
otherwise identical groups in dramatically different directions.33 
2. People are extremely vulnerable to the unanimous views of others and hence 
a single dissenter, or voice of sanity, is likely to have a huge impact.34 
3. If people are, by our lights, from some kind of “out group,” they are far less 
likely to influence us, even on the simplest questions.35 And if people are part 
of a group to which we also belong, they are far more likely to influence us, 
on both easy and hard questions.36  
 
My ultimate goal is to see how these points bear on the behavior of those 
involved in making, enforcing, and interpreting law. But let us begin by 
reviewing some classic studies. 
 
A. Hard Questions 
 
In the 1930s, the psychologist Muzafer Sherif conducted some simple 
experiments on sensory perception.37 Subjects were placed in a very dark room 
and a small pinpoint of light was positioned at some distance in front of them. 
Because of a perceptual illusion, the light, which was actually stationary, 
appeared to move. On each of several trials, Sherif asked people to estimate the 
distance that the light had moved. When polled individually, subjects did not 
agree with one another, and their answers varied from one trial to another. This 
is not surprising; because the light did not move, any judgment about distance 
was a stab in the dark. But Sherif found some striking results when subjects were 
                                                 
33 See p. below. 
34 See p. below. Note a parallel finding: A minority is especially likely to have influence if it 
consists of more than one person and if all members of the minority group are in basic 
agreement. See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 81-82 (1999). 
35 Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What to think By Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization 
and he Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity, and Group Polarization, 29 British J. Soc. Psych. 
97 (1990). Group membership and self-categorization are emphasized in John Turner et al., 
Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory 42-67 (1987). 
36 Dominic Abrams et al., supra note, at 97-110. 
37 Muzafer Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of Attitudes, 1 Sociometry 90 (1937). A 
good outline can be found in Lee Ross and Richard Nisbet, The Person and the Situation 28-30 
(1991). 
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 asked to act in small groups. Here the individual judgments converged and a 
group norm, establishing the right distance, quickly developed. Indeed, the norm 
remained stable within groups across different trials, thus leading to a situation 
in which different groups made, and were committed to, quite different 
judgments.38 There is an important clue here about how similar groups, indeed 
similar nations, can converge on very different beliefs and actions simply 
because of modest and even arbitrary variations in starting points.  
 
When Sherif added a confederate—his own ally, unbeknownst to 
subjects—something else happened.39 The judgment of the confederate, typically 
much higher or much lower than those made by individual subjects, helped 
produced correspondingly higher or lower judgments within the group. The 
large lesson is that at least in cases involving difficult questions of fact, 
judgments “could be imposed by an individual who had no coercive power and 
no special claim to expertise, only a willingness to be consistent and unwavering 
in the face of others’ uncertainty.”40 Perhaps more remarkable still, the group’s 
judgments became thoroughly internalized, so that subjects would adhere to 
them even when reporting on their own, even a year later, and even when 
participating in new groups whose members offered different judgments.41 The 
initial judgments were also found to have effects across “generations.” In an 
experiment in which fresh subjects were introduced and others retired, so that 
eventually all participants were new to the situation, the original group 
judgment tended to stick, even after the person who was originally responsible 
for it had been long gone.42  
 
What accounts for these results? The most obvious answer points to the 
informational influences produced by other people’s judgments. After all, the 
apparent movements are a perceptual illusion, and the system of perception does 
not readily assign distances to those movements. In those circumstances, people 
are especially likely to be swayed by a confident and consistent group member. 
This finding has implications outside of the laboratory and for classrooms, 
courtrooms, bureaucracies, and legislatures. If uninformed people are trying to 
decide whether global warming is a serious problem, or whether they should be 
                                                 
38 Id. at 29. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 29-30. 
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 concerned about existing levels of arsenic in drinking water, they are likely to be 
responsive to the views of confident and consistent others.43  
 
What is true for factual issues is true for moral, political, and legal issues 
as well. Suppose that a group of legislators is trying to decide how to handle a 
highly technical issue. If a “confederate” is planted among the group, showing 
considerable confidence, she is highly likely to be able to move the group in his 
preferred direction. So too if she is not a confederate at all, but simply an 
ordinary legislator with great confidence on the issue at hand. If judges are 
trying to resolve a complex issue on which they lack certainty, they too are 
vulnerable to conformity effects.44 And for judicial panels as well, Sherif-type 
effects can be expected on technical matters if one judge is confident and seems 
expert. The problem is that the so-called specialists may have biases and agendas 
of their own, leading to large errors. Note that there is an important qualification 
to these claims, to which I will return: Sherif’s conformity findings significantly 
decrease if the experimenter uses a confederate whose membership in a different 
social group is made salient to subjects.45  
 
B. Easy Questions 
 
But what if perception does provide reliable guidance? What if people 
have good reason to know the right answer? The leading experiments, conducted 
by Solomon Asch, explored whether people would be willing to overlook the 
apparently unambiguous evidence of their own senses.46 In these experiments, 
the subject was placed into a group of seven to nine people who seemed to be 
other subjects in the experiment but who were actually Asch’s confederates. The 
simple task was to “match” a particular line, shown on a large white card, to one 
of the three “comparison lines” that was identical to it in length. The two non-
matching lines were substantially different, with the differential varying from an 
inch and three quarters to three quarters of an inch.  
 
                                                 
43 See the discussion of authority in Robert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion 208-
36 (1993). For evidence that minority views can be influential if they are held by consistent, 
confident people, see Robert Bray et al., Social Influence By Group Members With Minority 
Opinions, 43 J Personality and Social Psych. 78 (1982). 
44 See section below. 
45 Abrams, supra note, at 99-104. 
46 See the overview in Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social 
Animal 13 (Elliott Aronson ed. 1995).  
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 In the first two rounds of the Asch experiments, everyone agrees about the 
right answer. “The discriminations are simple; each individual monotonously 
calls out the same judgment.”47 But “suddenly this harmony is disturbed at the 
third round.”48 All other group members make what is obviously, to the subject 
and to any reasonable person, a clear error, matching the line at issue to one that 
is conspicuously longer or shorter. In these circumstances, the subject, in all cases 
showing initial confusion and disbelief at the apparent mistakes of others, has a 
choice: He can maintain his independent judgment or instead accept the view of 
the unanimous majority. A large number of people end up yielding at least once 
in a series of trials. When asked to decide on their own, subjects erred less than 
1% of the time; but in rounds in which group pressure supported the incorrect 
answer, subjects erred 36.8% of the time.49 Indeed, in a series of twelve questions, 
no less than 70% of subjects went along with the group, and defied the evidence 
of their own senses, at least once.50 Conformity experiments of this kind have 
now produced 133 total sets of results from seventeen countries, including Zaire, 
Germany, France, Japan, Lebanon, and Kuwait.51 A meta-analysis of these studies 
uncovers a variety of refinements on Asch’s basic findings, but his basic 
conclusion has held up. For all results, the mean percentage error is 29%.52 People 
in some nations, with “conformist” cultures, do err more than people in other 
nations, with more “individualist” cultures.53 The variations are real, but the 
overall pattern of errors—with subjects conforming between 20% and 40% of the 
time—does not show huge differences across nations. 
 
Note that Asch’s findings contain two conflicting lessons. First, a 
significant number of people are independent all or much of the time. About 25% 
of people are consistently independent,54 and about two-thirds of total individual 
answers do not conform. Hence “there is evidence of extreme individual 
differences” in susceptibility to group influences, with some subjects remaining 
completely independent, and others “going with the majority without 
exception.”55 While independent subjects “present a striking spectacle to an 
                                                 
47 Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 453 (1952). 
48 Asch, Opinion and Social Pressures, supra note, at 13. 
49 Id. at 16.  
50 Id. 
51 See Rod Bond and Peter Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using 
Asch’s Line Judgment Task, 119 Psych. Bulletin 111, 116 (1996). 
52 Id. at 118. 
53 Id. at 128. 
54 Ronald Friend et al., A Puzzling Misinterpretation of the Asch “Conformity” Study, 20 
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 observer,” giving “the appearance of being unshakable,”56 other people show a 
great deal of anxiety and confusion.57 Second, most subjects, at least some of the 
time, are willing to yield to the group even on an apparently easy question on 
which they have direct and unambiguous evidence. For present purposes, the 
latter finding is the most important. 
 
C. Reasons and Blunders 
 
Why do people sometimes ignore the evidence of their own senses? The 
two principal explanations involve information and peer pressure. Some of 
Asch’s subjects seem to have thought that the unanimous confederates must be 
right; but other people, though believing that group members were 
unaccountably mistaken, were unwilling to make, in public, what those members 
would see as an error. In Asch’s own studies, several conformists said, in private 
interviews, that their own opinions must have been wrong58—a point that 
suggests that information, rather than peer pressure, is what was moving them.59 
This informational account is strengthened by one study in which people 
recorded their answers anonymously but gave nearly as many wrong answers as 
they had under Asch’s own conditions.60 A similar study finds that conformity is 
not lower when the subject’s response is unavailable to the majority.61 On the 
other hand, these are unusual results, and experimenters generally find 
significantly reduced error, in the same basic circumstances as Asch’s 
experiments, when the subject is asked to give a purely private answer.62 In the 
same way, easily identifiable conformity or deviation has been found to produce 
higher conformity.63 These findings suggest that peer pressure matters as well.  
 
Asch’s own conclusion was that his results raised the possibility that “the 
social process is polluted” by the “dominance of conformity.”64 He added, “That 
we have found the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that 
reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white 
                                                 
56 Id. at 466.  
57 Id. at 470. 
58 See Asch, supra. 
59 It would be possible to question this explanation, however, on the ground that some of these 
conformists might have been embarrassed to admit that they were vulnerable to peer influence, 
entirely apart from a belief that the peers might have been right. 
60 See Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance 149-50 (2000). 
61 Bond and Smith, supra note, at 124. 
62 See Aronson, supra note, at 23-24. 
63 See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 66 (1999). 
64 Asch, supra note, at 21. 
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 black is a matter of concern.”65 As I have noted, Asch’s experiments produce 
broadly similar findings across nations, and so in Asch’s sentence just quoted, 
the word “society” could well be replaced with the word “world.” But I want to 
stress another point here: Many people are not willing to disclose their own 
information to the group, even though it is in the group’s interest, most of the 
time, to learn what it is known or thought by individual members. To see this 
point, imagine a group almost all of whose members believe something to be 
true even though it is false. Imagine too that one member of the group, or a very 
few members of the group, know the truth. Are they likely to correct the 
dominant view? If Asch’s findings generalize, the answer is that they may not be. 
They are not reticent because they are irrational. They are making is a perfectly 
sensible response to the simple fact that the dominant view is otherwise—a fact 
that suggests either that the small minority is wrong or that they are likely to risk 
their own reputations if they insist that they are right. As we shall see, Asch’s 
findings help explain why groups can end up making unfortunate and even self-
destructive decisions. 
 
Would those findings apply to judgments about morality, policy, and 
law? It seems jarring to think that people would yield to a unanimous group 
when the question involves a moral, political, or legal issue on which they have 
great confidence. But if Asch is correct, such yielding should be expected, at least 
some of the time. We will find powerful evidence that this happens within 
federal courts of appeals.66 The deadening effect of public opinion was of course 
a central concern of John Stuart Mill, who insisted that protection “against the 
tyranny of the magistrate is not enough,” and that it was also important to 
protect “against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the 
tendency of society to impose, by other mans than civil penalties, its own ideas 
and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them . . .”67 Mill’s 
focus here is on the adverse effects of coerced conformity not only on the 
individuals who are thus tyrannized, but also on society itself, which is deprived 
of important information.68  
 
                                                 
65 Id.  
66 See below. 
67 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on 
Representative Government 73 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972). 
68 See id. at 72-76. 
14 
 D. How To Increase (or Decrease) Conformity 
 
 What factors increase or decrease conformity? Consistent with Sherif’s 
findings, people are less likely to conform if they have high social status or are 
extremely confident about their own views.69 They are more likely to conform if 
the task is difficult or if they are frightened.70 Consider also the following: 
 
1. Financial rewards for correct answers affect performance, and in two 
different ways.71 When people stand to make money if they are right, the rate of 
conformity is significantly decreased in the same basic condition as the Asch 
experiments, if the task is easy. People are less willing to follow group members 
when they stand to profit from a correct answer. But there is a striking difference 
when the experiments are altered to make the underlying task difficult. In that 
event, a financial incentive, rewarding correct answers, actually increases 
conformity. People are more willing to follow to crowd when they stand to profit 
from a correct answer if the question is hard. Perhaps most strikingly, the level of 
conformity is about the same, when financial incentives were absent, in low-
difficulty and high-difficulty tasks—but the introduction of financial rewards 
splits the results on those tasks dramatically apart, with significantly decreased 
conformity for low-difficulty tasks and significantly-increased conformity for 
high-difficulty tasks.72  
 
These results have simple explanations. A certain number of people, in the 
Asch experiments, actually know the right answer, and give conforming answers 
only because it is not worthwhile to reject the shared view of others in public. 
But when a financial incentive is offered, peer pressure is outweighed by the 
possibility of material gain. The simple lesson here is that an economic reward 
can counteract the effects of social pressures. By contrast, difficult tasks leave 
people with a great deal of uncertainty about whether they are right. In such 
circumstances, people are all the more likely to give weight to the views of 
others, simply because those views are the most reliable source of information. 
Consider in this regard the parallel finding that people’s confidence in their own 
judgments is directly related to the confidence shown by the experimenter’s 
confederates.73 When the confederates act with confidence and enthusiasm, 
                                                 
69 See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 66 (1999). 
70 Id. 
71 See Robert Baron et al., The Forgotten Variable in Conformity Research: Impact of Task 
Importance on Social Influence, 71 J Personality and Social Psych. 915 (1996). 
72 Id. at 923. 
73 Id. 
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 subjects also show heightened confidence in their judgments, even when they 
were simply following the crowd. Consider also the general claim that imitation 
of most other people can operate as a kind of fast and frugal heuristic, one that 
works well for many creatures, including human beings, in a wide variety of 
settings.74 Like most heuristics, the imitation heuristic, while generally sensible 
and often the best available, also produces errors in many situations.75 
 
There is a disturbing implication. A “majority consensus” is “often 
capable of misleading individuals into inaccurate, irrational, or unjustified 
judgments.” Such a consensus “can also produce heightened confidence in such 
judgments as well.” 76 It follows that “so long as the judgments are difficult or 
ambiguous, and the influencing agents are united and confident, increasing the 
importance of accuracy will heighten confidence as well as conformity—a 
dangerous combination.”77 The point very much bears on the sources of 
unjustified extremism, especially under circumstances in which countervailing 
information is unavailable.78 The same point helps explain group influences 
within the federal courts.79 
 
2. Asch’s original studies found that varying the size of the group of 
confederates, unanimously making the erroneous decision, mattered only up to a 
number of three; increases from that point had little effect.80 Using one 
confederate did not increase subjects’ errors at all; using two confederates 
increased errors to 13.6%; and using from three confederates increased error to 
31.8%, not substantially different from the level that emerged from further 
increases in group size. But Asch’s own findings appear unusual on this count. 
Subsequent studies have found that, contrary to Asch’s own findings, increases 
in the size of the group of confederates usually do increase conformity.81  
 
More significantly, a modest variation in the experimental conditions 
made all the difference: the existence of at least one compatriot, or voice of 
sanity, dramatically reduced both conformity and error. When one confederate 
                                                 
74 See Daniel Goldstein et al., Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work?, in Bounded 
Rationality, supra note, at 174. 
75 See id. 
76 Baron et al., supra note, at 925. 
77 Id. at 925. 
78 See Hardin, supra note. 
79 See below. 
80 Asch, supra note. 
81 Baron, supra note, at 119-20. 
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 made a correct match, errors were reduced by three-quarters, even if there was a 
strong majority the other way.82 There is a clear implication here: If a group is 
embarking on an unfortunate course of action, a single dissenter might be able to 
turn it around, by energizing ambivalent group members who would otherwise 
follow the crowd. It follows that affective ties among members, making even a 
single dissent less likely, might well undermine the performance of groups and 
institutions. Consider here a study of the performance of investment clubs—
small groups of people who pool their money to make joint decisions about stock 
market investments.83 The worst-performing clubs were built on affective ties 
and primarily social; the best-performing clubs limited social connections and 
were focused on increasing returns. Dissent was far more frequent in the high-
performing clubs. The low performers usually had unanimous votes, with little 
open debate. The problem is that the votes in low performing groups were “cast 
to build social cohesion rather than to make the best financial choice.”84 In short, 
conformity resulted in significantly lower returns. 
 
3. Much depends on the subject’s perceived relationship to the 
experimenters’ confederates and in particular on whether the subject considers 
himself part of the same group in which those confederates fall. If the subject 
identified himself as a member of a different group from the majority, the 
conformity effect is greatly reduced.85 People are especially likely to conform 
when the group consists of people whom subjects like or admire, or otherwise 
identify with.86 The general point explains why group membership is often 
emphasized by those who seek to increase or decrease the influence of a certain 
point of view. Perhaps an advocate can be discredited, without the relevant 
group, by showing that he is a “conservative” or a “liberal,” prone to offer 
unacceptable views. 
 
Thus conformity—and hence error—is dramatically increased, in public 
statements, when the subject perceives himself as part of a reasonably discrete 
                                                 
82 Id. at 18. The finding here is reminiscent of the tale of The Emperor’s New Clothes, in which a 
single voice of sanity was necessary and sufficient to expose the truth. See Hans Christian 
Anderson, The Emperor’s New Suit, in Hans Christian Anderson, Shorter Tales (Jean Hersholt 
trans. 1948; originally published 1837). 
83 Brooke Harrington, Cohesion, Conflict and Group Demography (unpublished manuscript 
2000), 
84 Id.  
85 Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who You Are, 29 Brit J Soc Psych 
97, 104-110 (1990). 
86 Baron et al., supra, at 66. The point is stressed at various places in Turner, supra note; see, e.g., 
pp. 151-170. 
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 group that includes the experimenter’s confederates (all, like himself, psychology 
majors, for example).87 By contrast, conformity is dramatically decreased, and 
hence error is also dramatically decreased, in public statements when the subject 
perceives himself as in a different group from the experimenter’s confederates 
(all but himself ancient history majors, for example).88 Notably, private opinions, 
expressed anonymously afterwards, were about the same whether or not the 
subject perceived himself as a member of the same group as others in the 
experiment. And people who thought that they were members of the same group 
as the experimenter’s confederates gave far more accurate answers, and far less 
conforming answers, when they were speaking privately.89 In the real world, 
would-be dissenters might silence themselves partly when and because they 
trust group members to be right, partly because they do not want to risk the 
opprobrium of like-minded others, and partly because they fear that they will, 
through their dissent, weaken the effectiveness and reputation of the group to 
which they belong. There is a large lesson here. Publicly expressed statements, 
showing agreement with a majority view, may be both wrong and insincere, 
especially when relevant speakers identify themselves as members of the same 
group as the majority.90 The finding of heightened conformity is linked with 
evidence of poor performance by groups whose members are connected by 
                                                 
87 Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who You Are, 29 Brit J Soc Psych 
97, 106-08 (1990).  
88 Id. 
89 See Abrams et al., supra note, at 108. By contrast, people who thought that they were members 
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largest number of conforming, inaccurate responses came when people thought of themselves in 
the same group and were speaking publicly -- even though the number of inaccurate private 
responses in that experimental condition was not notably higher than in other conditions. See 
Abrams et al., supra note, at 108. 
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 affective ties; in such groups, people are less likely to say what they know and 
more likely to suppress disagreement. A system of checks and balances, 
attempting to ensure that ambition will check ambition,91 can be understood as a 
way of increasing the likelihood of dissent, and of decreasing the likelihood that 
members of any particular group, or institution, will be reluctant to disclose what 
they think and know.92  
 
E. Shocks, Authority, and Expertise 
 
 In the Sherif and Asch experiments, no particular person has special 
expertise. No member of the group shows unusual measurement abilities or 
wonderful eyesight. But we might safely predict that subjects would be even 
more inclined to blunder if they had reason to believe that one or more of the 
experimenters’ confederates was particularly likely to be correct. This hypothesis 
receives support from a possible interpretation of one of the most alarming 
findings in modern social science, involving conformity not to the judgments of 
peers, but to the will of an experimenter.93 These experiments are of independent 
interest, because they have implications for social influences on judgments of 
morality, not merely facts. 
 
                                                 
91 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Ambition must 
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Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority, in Obedience to Authority: 
Critical Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm 35, 38-44 (Thomas Blass ed. 1999). Shiller, supra 
note, at 150-51. 
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  The experiments, conducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgram, ask 
people to administer electric shocks to a person sitting in an adjacent room.94 
Subjects are told, falsely, that the purpose of the experiment is to test the effects 
of punishment on memory. Unbeknownst to the subject, the victim of the electric 
shocks is a confederate and there are no real shocks. The apparent shocks are 
delivered by a simulated shock generator, offering thirty clearly delineated 
voltage levels, ranging from 15 to 450 volts, accompanied by verbal descriptions 
ranging from “Slight Shock” to “Danger: Severe Shock.”95 As the experiment 
unfolds, the subject is asked to administer increasingly severe shocks for 
incorrect answers, to and past the “Danger: Severe Shock” level, which begins at 
400 volts. 
 
 In Milgram’s original experiments, the subjects included forty men 
between the ages of 20 and 50. They came from a range of occupations, including 
engineers, high school teachers, and postal clerks.96 They were paid $4.50 for 
their participation—and also told that they could keep the money no matter how 
the experiment went. The “memory test” involved remembering word pairs; 
every mistake, by the confederate/victim, was to be met by an electric shock and 
a movement to one higher level on the shock generator. To ensure that 
everything seems authentic, the subject is, at the beginning of the experiment, 
given an actual sample shock at the lowest level. But the subject is also assured 
that the shocks are not dangerous, with the experimenter declaring, in response 
to a prearranged question from the confederate, “Although the shocks can be 
extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage.”97  
 
In the original experiments, the victim does not make any protest until the 
300-volt shock, which produces a loud kick, by the victim, on the wall of the 
room where he is bound to the electric chair. After that point, the victim does not 
answer further questions, and is heard from only after the 315-volt shock, when 
he pounds on the wall again—and is not heard from thereafter, even with 
increases in shocks to and past the 400-volt level. If the subject indicates an 
unwillingness to continue, the experimenter offers prods of increasing firmness, 
from “Please go on” to “You have no other choice; you must go on.”98 But the 
experimenter has no power to impose sanctions on subjects. 
                                                 
94 See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, in Readings About the Social Animal 23 
(7th ed. 1995). 
95 Id. at 24.  
96 Id. at 25. 
97 Id. at 27. 
98 Id. at 29. 
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 Most people predict that in such studies, over 95% of subjects would 
refuse to proceed to the end of the series of shocks. When people are asked to 
make predictions about what people would do, the expected breakoff point is 
“Very Strong Shock,”99 of 195 volts. But in Milgram’s experiment, every one of 
the forty subjects went beyond 300 volts. The mean maximum shock level was 
405 volts; and a strong majority—26 of 40, or 65%—went to the full 450-volt 
shock, two steps beyond “Danger: Severe Shock.” 100  
 
Later variations on the original experiments produced even more 
remarkable results. In those experiments, the victim expresses a growing level of 
pain and distress as the voltage increases.101 Small grunts are heard from 75 volts 
to 105 volts, and at 120 volts, the subject shouts, to the experimenter, that the 
shocks were starting to become painful. At 150 volts, the victims cries out, 
“Experimenter, get me out of here! I won’t be in the experiment any more! I 
refuse to go on!”102 At 180 volts, the victim says, “I can’t stand the pain.” At 270 
volts he responds with an agonized scream. At 300 volts he shouts that he will no 
longer answer the questions. At 315 volts he screams violently. At 330 volts and 
after, he is not heard. In this version of the experiment, there is no significant 
change in Milgram’s results: 25 of 40 participants went to the maximum level, 
and the mean maximum level was over 360 volts. In a somewhat gruesome 
variation, the victim says, before the experiment begins, that he has a heart 
condition, and his pleas to discontinue the experiment include repeated reference 
to the fact his heart is “bothering” him as the shocks continue.103 This too did not 
lead subjects to behave differently.104 
 
Milgram himself explains his results as showing obedience to authority, in 
a way reminiscent of the behavior Germans under Nazi rule; and indeed 
Milgram was partly motivated by the goal of understanding how the Holocaust 
could have happened.105 Milgram concluded that ordinary people will follow 
orders even if the result is to produce great suffering in innocent others. 
Undoubtedly simple obedience is part of the picture. But there is another 
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 explanation.106 Subjects who are invited to an academic setting, to participate in 
an experiment run by an apparently experienced scientist, might well defer to the 
experimenters’ instructions in the belief that the experimenter is likely to know 
what should be done, all things considered. If the experimenter asks subjects to 
proceed, most subjects might believe, not unreasonably, that the harm 
apparently done to the victims is not serious and that the experiment actually has 
significant benefits for society. On this account, the experimenter has special 
expertise. If this is right, then the participants in the Milgram experiments might 
be seen as similar to those in the Asch experiments, with the experimenter 
having a greatly amplified voice. And on this account, many of the subjects 
might have put their moral qualms to one side, not because of blind obedience, 
but because of a judgment that those qualms are likely to have been ill-founded. 
That judgment might be based in turn on a belief that the experimenter is not 
likely to ask subjects to proceed if the experiment is truly objectionable.  
 
In short, Milgram’s subjects might be responding to an especially loud 
informational signal—the sort of signal sent by a specialist or a crowd. And on 
this view, Milgram was wrong to draw an analogy between the behavior of his 
subjects and the behavior of Germans under Hitler. His subjects were not simply 
obeying a leader, but responding to someone whose credentials and good faith 
they thought they could trust. Of course it is not simple, in theory or in practice, 
to distinguish between obeying a leader and accepting the beliefs of an expert. 
The only suggestion is that the obedience of subjects was hardly baseless; it 
involved a setting in which subjects had some reason to think that the 
experimenter was not asking them to produce serious physical harm out of 
sadism or for no reason at all. 
 
A subsequent study, exploring the grounds of obedience, offers support 
for this claim.107 In that study, a large number of subjects watched the tapes of the 
Milgram experiments, and were asked to rank possible explanations for 
compliance with the experimenter’s request. Deference to expertise was the 
highest-rank option. This is not definitive, of course, but an illuminating 
variation on the basic experiment, by Milgram himself, provides further 
support.108 In this variation, the subject is among three people asked to 
administer the shocks, and two of those people, actually confederates, refuse to 
go past a certain level (150 volts for one and 210 volts for the other). In such 
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 cases, the overwhelming majority of subjects, 92.5%,defy the experimenter.109 
This was by far the most effective of Milgram’s many variations on his basic 
study, all designed to reduce the level of obedience.110  
 
Why was the defiance of peers so potent? I suggest that the subjects, in 
this variation, were very much like those subjects who had at least one 
supportive confederate in Asch’s experiments. One such confederate led Asch’s 
subjects to say what they saw; so too, peers who acted on the basis of conscience 
freed Milgram’s subject to follow their consciences as well. Milgram himself 
established, in yet another variation, that without any advice from the 
experimenter, and without any external influences at all, the subject’s moral 
judgment was clear: do not administer shocks above a very low level.111 Indeed 
that moral judgment had nearly the same degree of clarity, to Milgram’s subjects, 
as the clear and correct factual judgments made by Asch’s subjects when they 
were deciding about the length of lines on their own (and hence not confronted 
with Asch’s confederates). In Milgram’s experiments, it was the experimenter’s 
own position—that the shocks should continue and that no permanent damage 
would be done—that had a high degree of influence, akin to the influence of the 
Asch’s unanimous confederates. But when the subject’s peers rejected the 
position of Milgram’s experimenter, the informational content of that position 
was effectively negated by the information presented by the refusals of peers. 
Hence subjects could rely on their own moral judgments, or even follow the 
moral signals indicated by the peers’ refusals.  
 
The general lessons are not obscure. When the morality of a situation is 
not clear, people might well be influenced by someone who seems to be a expert, 
able to weigh the risks involved. But when the expert’s questionable moral 
judgment is countered by reasonable people, who bring their own moral 
judgments to bear, most people are unlikely to follow experts. They are far more 
likely to do as their conscience dictates. As we shall see, compliance with law has 
similar features. A legal pronouncement about what should be done will often 
operate in the same way as an expert judgment about what should be done. It 
follows that people will follow the law even when it is hardly ever enforced—
and even if they would otherwise be inclined to question the judgment that the 
law embodies. But if peers are willing to violate the law, violations may become 
widespread, especially but not only if people think that the law is enjoining them 
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 from doing something that they wish to do, either for selfish reasons or for 
reasons of principle. In this way, Milgram’s experiments offer some lessons 
about when law will be ineffective unless vigorously enforced—and also about 
the preconditions for civil disobedience. 
 
III. Cascades 
 
I now examine how informational and reputational influences can 
produce social cascades—large-scale social movements in which many people 
end up thinking something, or doing something, because of the beliefs or actions 
of a few early movers. As in the case of conformity, participation in cascades is 
fueled by social influences. But where the idea of conformity helps to explain 
social stability, an understanding of cascades helps to explain social and legal 
movements, which can be stunningly rapid, and which can also produce 
situations that are highly unstable.  
 
Cascades can involve judgments about facts or values. They operate 
within legislatures and the judicial system as well as within groups of citizens. 
And when people have affective connections with one another, the likelihood of 
cascades increases. In the area of social risks, cascades are especially common, 
with people coming to fear certain products and processes not because of private 
knowledge, but because of the apparent fears of others.112 The system of legal 
precedent also produces cascades, as early decisions lead later courts to a certain 
result, and eventually most or all courts come into line, not because of 
independent judgments, but because of a decision to follow the apparently 
informed decisions of others.113 The sheer level of agreement will be misleading if 
most courts have been influenced, even decisively influenced, by their 
predecessors, especially in highly technical areas. 
 
By themselves cascades are neither good nor bad. It is possible that the 
underlying processes will lead people to sound decisions about risks, morality, 
or law. The problem, a serious one, is that people may well converge, through 
the same processes, on erroneous or insufficiently justified outcomes. But to say 
this is to get ahead of the story; let us begin with the mechanics. 
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 A. Informational Cascades: The Basic Phenomenon 
 
In an informational cascade, people cease relying, at a certain point, on 
their private information or opinions. They decide instead on the basis of the 
signals conveyed by others. Once this happens, the subsequent actions, made by 
few or many others, add no new information. It follows that the behavior of the 
first few actors can, in theory, produce similar behavior from countless followers. 
A particular problem arises if people think that the large number of people who 
say or do something are acting on independent knowledge; this can make it very 
hard to stop the cascade. 
 
1. A simple illustration. Begin with a stylized example, and suppose that 
doctors are deciding whether to prescribe hormone therapy for menopausal 
women. If hormone therapy creates significant risks of heart disease, its net 
value, let us assume, is –1; if it does not create such risks, its net value is +1.114 Let 
us also assume that the doctors are in a temporal queue, and each doctor knows 
his place on that queue. From his own experience, each doctor has some private 
information about what should be done. But each doctor also cares, rationally, 
about the judgments of others. Anderson is the first to decide, and prescribes 
hormone therapy if his judgment is low risk but declines if his judgment is high 
risk. Suppose that Anderson prescribes. Barber now knows that Anderson’s 
judgment was low risk and that she too should certainly urge hormone therapy if 
she makes that independent judgment. But if her independent judgment is that 
the risk is high, she would—if she trusts Anderson no more and no less than she 
trusts herself—be indifferent about whether to prescribe, and might simply flip a 
coin.  
 
Now turn to a third doctor, Carlton. Suppose that both Anderson and 
Barber have prescribed hormone therapy, but that Carlton’s own information 
suggests that the risk is high. In that event, Carlton might well ignore what he 
knows and prescribe the therapy. It is likely, in these circumstances, that both 
Anderson and Barber saw a low risk, and unless Carlton thinks that his own 
information is better than theirs, he should follow their lead. If he does, Carlton 
is in a cascade. To the extent that Carlton is not acting on the basis of his own 
information, and to the extent that subsequent doctors know what others have 
done and why, they will do exactly what Carlton did: prescribe hormone therapy 
regardless of their private information. “Since opposing information remains 
                                                 
114 I draw here on David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind, in The New Economics of 
Human Behavior 188, 193-94 (Marianno Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli eds.,1995); 
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 hidden, even a mistaken cascade lasts forever. An early preponderance toward 
either adoption or rejection, which may have occurred by mere coincidence or for 
trivial reasons, can feed upon itself . . .”115  
 
Notice that the serious problem here lies in the fact that for those in a 
cascade, actions do not disclose privately held information. In the example just 
given, doctors’ actions will not reflect the overall knowledge, or the aggregate 
knowledge, of the health consequences of hormone therapy—even if the 
information held by individual doctors, if actually revealed and aggregated, 
would give a quite accurate picture of the situation. The reason for the problem is 
that individual doctors are following the lead of those who came before. As 
noted, this problem is aggravated if subsequent doctors overestimate the extent 
to which their predecessors relied on private information and did not merely 
follow those who came before. If this is so, subsequent doctors might fail to rely 
on, and fail to reveal, private information that actually exceeds the information 
collectively held by those who started the cascade. The problem here is that the 
medical profession generally will lack information that it needs to have. 
Participants in cascades act rationally in suppressing their private information, 
whose disclosure would benefit the group more than the individual who has it.116 
The failure to disclose private information therefore presents a free-rider 
problem. To overcome that problem, some kind of institutional reform seems to 
be necessary. 
 
Of course cascades do not always develop, and of course they usually do 
not last forever. Often people have, or think that they have, enough private 
information to reject the accumulated wisdom of others. Medical specialists 
sometimes fall in this category. When cascades develop, they might be broken by 
corrective information, as has apparently happened in the case of hormone 
replacement therapy itself.117 In the domain of science, peer-reviewed work 
provides a valuable safeguard. But even among specialists and indeed doctors, 
cascades are common. “Most doctors are not at the cutting edge of research; their 
inevitable reliance upon what colleagues have done and are doing leads to 
numerous surgical fads and treatment-caused illnesses.”118 Thus an article in the 
prestigious New England Journal of Medicine explores “bandwagon diseases” in 
which doctors act like “lemmings, episodically and with a blind infectious 
                                                 
115 Id. at 195. 
116 See  
117 Gina Kolata, “Risk of Breast Cancer Halts Hormone Replacement Study,” New York Times, at 
http://site.mumsweb.com/article.php?sid=759 (July 11, 2002). 
118 Hirshleifer, supra note, at 204. 
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 enthusiasm pushing certain diseases and treatments primarily because everyone 
else is doing the same.”119 Some medical practices, including tonsillectomy, 
“seem to have been adopted initially based on weak information,” and extreme 
differences in tonsillectomy frequencies (and other procedures) provide good 
evidence that cascades are at work.120 And once several doctors join the cascade, 
it is liable to spread. There is a link here with Sherif’s experiments, showing the 
development of divergent but entrenched norms, based on group processes in 
areas in which individuals lack authoritative information. In fact, prescriptions of 
hormone replacement therapy were fueled by cascade-like processes.121  
 
What is true for doctors is highly likely to be true for lawyers, engineers, 
legislators, bureaucrats, judges, investors,122 and academics123 as well. It is easy to 
see how cascades might develop among groups of citizens, especially but not 
only if those groups are small, insulated, and connected by affective ties. If Barry 
does not know whether global warming is a serious problem, and if Alberta 
insists that it is, Barry might well be persuaded, and their friend Charles is likely 
to go along, making it unlikely that Danielle will be willing to reject the shared 
judgment of the developing group. When small communities of like-minded 
people end up fearing a certain risk, or fearing and hating another group, 
cascades are often responsible.  
 
2. Precedential cascades. Consider a legal analogue124: There is a disputed 
issue under the Endangered Species Act. The first court of appeals to decide the 
question finds the issue genuinely difficult, but resolves the issue favorably to 
the government. The second court of appeals favors, very slightly, the view that 
the government is wrong, but the holding of another circuit is enough to tip the 
scales in the government’s favor. A third court of appeals is also slightly 
predisposed to rule against the government, but it lacks the confidence to reject 
the shared view of two circuits. Eventually all circuits come into line, with the 
final few feeling the great weight of the unanimous position of others, and 
perhaps insufficiently appreciating the extent to which that weight is a product 
                                                 
119 John F. Burnham, 317 New England Journal of Medicine 1220, 1201 (1987). 
120 See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, 12 J Econ Persp 151, 167 (1998). 
121 Tim O’Shea, “The Creation of a Market: How Did the Whole HRT Thing Get Started in the 
First Place?” at www.mercola.com/2001/jul/4/hrt5.htm (July 2001). 
122 See Hirshleifer, supra note, at 205; Shiller, supra note. 
123 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1251 (2001). 
124 Cf. Andrew F. Daughtety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment, 1 Am Law and 
Ec. Rev. 158 (1999).  
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 of an early and somewhat idiosyncratic judgment. Because the courts of appeals 
are in agreement, the Supreme Court denies certiorari. 
 
To be sure, precedential cascades do not always happen, and splits among 
courts of appeals are common.125 One reason is that subsequent courts often have 
sufficient confidence to conclude that predecessor courts have erred. But it is 
inevitable that cascades will sometimes develop, especially in highly technical 
areas, and it will be hard to detect them after they have occurred. The 
prescriptive implication is clear: Judicial panels should be cautious about giving 
a great deal of weight to the shared view of two or more courts of appeals. A 
patient who seeks a second opinion does well not to disclose the first opinion to 
his new doctor, so as to ensure independence; so too, a court of appeals should 
be alert to the possibility that the unanimity of previous courts does not reflect 
independent agreement. And when the Supreme Court rejects the unanimous 
view of a large number of courts of appeals, a precedential cascade might well 
have been responsible for the unanimity.126 For the legal system, the danger is 
that a cascade, producing agreement among the lower courts, might prove self-
insulating as well as self-reinforcing. Unless there is clear error, why should the 
Supreme Court become involved? 
 
3. Rationality and error. In informational cascades as discussed thus far, 
each participant is being entirely rational; they are acting as they should in the 
face of limited information. But as I have suggested, it is possible that 
participants in the cascade will fail to see the extent to which the decisions of 
their predecessors carry little independent information. If most scientists think 
that global warming is a serious problem, can they really be wrong? A possible 
answer is that they might indeed be wrong, especially if they are not relying on 
their private information and are following the signals sent by other people. And 
people often seem to mistake a cascade for a series of separate and independent 
judgments. In 2001, for example, hundreds of law professors signed a statement 
condemning, on constitutional grounds, President Bush’s decision to permit 
military tribunals to try suspected terrorists.127 The sheer number of signatures 
seems extremely impressive. But it is perhaps less so if we consider the 
likelihood that most signatories lacked reliable information on the esoteric legal 
issue in question, and were simply following the apparently reliable but actually 
uninformative judgment of numerous others.  
                                                 
125 See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 So. Cal. L. Rev. 87 (1999).  
126 See Daughety and Reinganum, supra note, at 161-65. 
127 See XX 
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Despite the rationality of those who participate in informational cascades, 
there is a serious risk of error. People might easily converge on an erroneous, 
damaging, or dangerous path, simply because they are failing to disclose and to 
act on the basis of all the information that they have.128 
 
4. Laboratory evidence. Cascades are easy to create in laboratory settings. 
Some of the experiments are detailed and a bit technical, but four general lessons 
are clear. First, people will often neglect their own private information and defer 
to the information provided by their predecessors. Second, people are alert to 
whether their predecessors are especially informed; more informed people can 
shatter a cascade. Third, and perhaps most intriguingly, cascade effects are 
greatly reduced if people are rewarded not for correct individual decisions, but 
for correct decisions by a majority of the group to which they belong. Fourth, 
cascade effects, and blunders, are significantly increased if people are rewarded 
not for correct decisions, but for decisions that conform to the decisions made by 
most people. As we shall see, these general lessons have implications for 
institutional design. They suggest that errors are most likely when people are 
                                                 
128 See Hirchleifer, supra note, at 204-05 (discussing evidence from medicine and science). This 
suggestion does not mean that when people participate in cascades, they do worse than they 
would do if they did not see the decisions of their predecessors. In some cases, they do better. 
Imagine if the early movers have relatively good information, or are lucky, and if the later 
decisionmakers have little information, or are systematically confused. In such situations, 
cascades will make the situation better than it would be if prior decisions were not observed. Lisa 
Anderson and Charles Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 Am Econ Rev 847, 852 
(1997), showing four sessions in which people did better because they did not rely on their 
private information. But we could also imagine situations in which the early movers do not have 
especially good information, or are unlucky, and in which later decisionmakers have fairly good 
information. In those situations, independent judgments would produce far better outcomes than 
cascade behavior. See id., showing a session in which a cascade produced more error s than 
would have resulted from reliance on private information. As compared with non-observation, 
cascades systematically produce greater variance, simply because the early movers have so much 
influence. See Edward Parson, Richard Zeckhauser, and Cary Coglianese, Collective Silence and 
Individual Voice: The Logic of Information Games, forthcoming in Collective Choice: Essays in 
Honor of Mancur Olson (J. Heckelman and D. Coates eds. 2003); Eric Posner, Four Economic 
Perspectives on American Labor Law and the Problem of Social Conflict, J. of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics (forthcoming 2003). But it cannot be said, in the abstract, that cascades 
produce greater inaccuracy than non-observation. 
In short, the basic claim is not that those who participate in cascades generally do worse 
than those who cannot observe the choices of others. The claim is instead that those who 
participate in cascades fail to disclose information that they have, and that as a result, they 
produce worse outcomes than would result if people revealed that information. 
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 rewarded for conforming, and least likely when people are rewarding for 
helping groups and institutions to decide correctly. 
 
The simplest experiment asked subjects to guess whether the experiment 
was using Urn A, which contained two red balls and one white, or Urn B, which 
contained two white balls and one red.129 In each period, the contents of the 
chosen urn were emptied in a container. A randomly selected subject was asked 
to make one (and only one) private draw of a ball. After that draw, the subject 
recorded, on an answer sheet, the color of the draw and his own decision about 
the urn. The subject’s draw is not announced to the group, but the subject’s 
decision about the urn is disclosed. Then the urn is passed to the next subject for 
his own private draw, which is not disclosed, and his own decision about the 
urn, which is disclosed. This process continued until all subjects had made 
decisions, and at that time the experimenter announced the actual urn used. 
Subjects could earn $2 for a correct decision.  
 
In this experiment, cascades often developed. After a number of 
individual judgments were revealed, people sometimes announced decisions 
that were inconsistent with their private draw, but that fit with the majority of 
previous announcements.130 Over 77% of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15% 
of private announcements did not reveal a “private signal,” that is, the 
information provided by people’s own draw. Consider cases in which one 
person’s draw (say, red) contradicted the announcement of his predecessor (say, 
Urn B). In such cases, the second announcement nonetheless matched the first 
about 11% of the time—far less than a majority, but enough to ensure occasional 
cascades. And when one person’s draw contradicted the announcement of two 
or more predecessors, the second announcement was likely to follow those who 
went before. Notably, the majority of decisions followed Bayes’ rule, and hence 
were rationally based on available information131—but erroneous cascades were 
                                                 
129 See Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 Am Econ Rev 
847 (1997). 
130 See Angela Hung and Charles Plott, Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to 
Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions, 91 Am Econ Rev 1508, 1515 (2001). 
131 Thus 72% of subjects followed Bayes’ rule in the Anderson/Holt experiment, and 64% in Marc 
Willinger and Anthony Ziegelmeyet, Are More Informed Agents Able To Shatter Information 
Cascades in the Lab, in The Economics of Networks: Interaction and Behaviours 291, 304 (Patrick 
Cohendet et al. eds. 1996). 
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 nonetheless found. Here is an actual example of a cascade producing an 
entertainingly inaccurate outcome (the urn used was B)132: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private Draw a a b b b b 
Decision A A A A A A 
 
What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of private 
information —four whites and two reds—justified the correct judgment, in favor 
of Urn B. But the existence of two early signals, producing rational but incorrect 
judgments, led all others to fall in line. “[I]nitial misrepresentative signals start a 
chain of incorrect decisions that is not broken by more representative signals 
received later.”133 It should be simple to see how this result might map onto real-
world assessments of factual, moral, and legal issues, especially in insulated 
groups, where external correction is less likely.  
 
B. How To Make and Break Cascades 
 
Is the likelihood of cascades affected by institutional arrangements and 
social norms? Can legal arrangements diminish or increase the risk of erroneous 
cascades, inadvertently or through conscious decision134? A central point here is 
that in an informational cascade, everyone is equal; people are simply trying to 
get the right answer; and people pay attention to the views and acts of others 
only because they want to be right. But it is easy to imagine slight alterations of 
the situation, so that some participants know more than others, or so that people 
do not only care whether they are right. How would these alterations affect 
outcomes?  
 
1. Fashion leaders and informed cascade-breakers. In the real world of 
cascades, “fashion leaders” have unusual importance.135 A prominent scientist 
might declare that global warming is a serious problem; a well-respected 
political leader might urge that war should be made against Iraq; a lawyer with 
                                                 
132 See Marc Willinger and Anthony Ziegelmeyet, Are More Informed Agents Able To Shatter 
Information Cascades in the Lab, in The Economics of Networks: Interaction and Behaviours 291 
(Patrick Cohendet et al. eds. 1996). 
133 Anderson and Holt, supra note, at 859. 
134 See Talley, supra note, for a suggestion that certain features of the legal system, including long 
judicial tenures and non-opaque decisions, reduce the likelihood of bad cascades. Talley 
persuasively shows that the likelihood is reduced – but not eliminated. 
135 Hirshleifer, supra note, at 197-98. 
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 particular credibility might conclude that recent antiterrorist legislation violates 
the Constitution. In any of these cases, the speaker provides an especially loud 
informational signal, perhaps sufficient to start or to stop a cascade.  
 
Now turn to the actions of followers. In the hormone therapy case, no 
doctor is assumed to have, or to believe that she has, more information than her 
predecessors. But in many cases, people know, or think that they know, a great 
deal. It is obvious that such people are far less likely to follow those who came 
before. Whether they will do so should depend on a comparison between the 
amount of information provided by the behavior of predecessors and the amount 
of private information that they have. And in principle, more informed people 
will shatter cascades, possibly initiating new and better ones. Whether this will 
happen, in practice, depends on whether the people who come later know, or 
believe, that the deviant agent was actually well-informed. If so, the more 
informed people operate as fashion leaders.  
 
A simple study attempts to test the question whether more informed 
people actually shatter cascades.136 The study was essentially the same as the urn 
experiment just described, except that players had a special option after any 
sequence of two identical decisions (for example, two “Urn A” decisions): They 
could make not one but two independent draws before deciding. The other 
subjects were informed of every case in which a player was making two draws. 
The simplest finding is that this “shattering mechanism” did indeed reduce the 
number of cascades—and thus significantly improved decisions.137 But the 
mechanism did not work perfectly. In some cases, cascades were nonetheless 
found. And in some cases, people who were permitted to draw twice, and saw 
two different balls (say, one red and one white), concluded, irrationally, that the 
cascade should be broken. The remarkable and somewhat disturbing outcome is 
that they initiated an inaccurate cascade. Consider this evidence, in a case in 
which the actual urn was A: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private Draw a a b, a b a b 
Decision A A B B B B 
 
This disturbing pattern undoubtedly has real-world analogues, in which 
people sometimes give excessive weight to their own information, even if that 
                                                 
136 Willinger and Ziegelmeyet, supra. 
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 information is ambiguous and in which it makes sense to follow the crowd. But 
the larger point is the simple one: More informed people are less influenced by 
the signals of others, and they also carry more influence themselves.  
 
But what about cases in which fashion leaders are not necessarily more 
informed, or in which they are seen by others as having more information, or 
more wisdom, than they actually have? We can imagine self-styled experts—on 
diets, or herbal foods, or alternative medicine, or economic trends—who 
successfully initiate cascades. The risk here is that the views of fashion leaders 
will be wrongly taken as authoritative. The result can be to lead people to errors 
and even to illness and death. How can society protect itself? He answers lie in 
good institutional arrangements, civil liberties, free markets, and good social 
norms, encouraging people to be skeptical of supposed experts. In systems with 
freedom of speech and free markets, it is always possible to debunk supposedly 
authoritative sources. And within groups, it is possible to structure 
decisionmaking so as to reduce the relevant risks. Votes might, for example, be 
taken in reverse order of seniority, so as to ensure that less experienced people 
will not be unduly influenced by the judgments of their predecessors; this is in 
fact the practice on the United States Supreme Court. 
 
2. Majority rule: rewarding correct outcomes by groups rather than by 
individuals. How would the development of cascades be affected by an 
institution that rewards correct answers not by individuals, but by the majority 
of the group? In an intriguing variation on the urn experiment, subjects were 
paid $2 for a correct group decision, and penalized $2 for an incorrect group 
decision, with the group decision determined by majority rule.138 People were 
neither rewarded nor punished for a correct individual decision. The result was 
that only 39% of rounds saw cascades. In 92% of cases, people’s announcement 
matched their private draw.139 And because people revealed their private signals, 
the system of majority rule produced a substantial increase in fully informed 
decisions—that is, the outcomes that someone would reach if he were somehow 
able to see all private information in the system. A simple way to understand this 
point is to assume that a group has a large number of members and that each 
member makes an announcement that matches his private draw. As a statistical 
matter, it is overwhelmingly likely that the majority’s position will be correct. As 
                                                 
138 Id. at 1511. 
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 an example, consider this period from the majority rule experiment140 (the actual 
urn was A): 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Private 
Draw 
a a a a b a a a b 
Decision A A A A B A A A B 
 
What is the explanation for this significantly reduced level of cascade 
behavior in a system of majority rule? The answer lies in the fact that the 
individual knows that he has nothing to gain from a correct individual decision 
and everything to gain from a correct group decision. As a result, it is in the 
individual’s interest to say exactly what he sees, because it is the accurate 
announcement, from each person, that is most likely to promote an accurate 
group decision.141  
 
Note that to explain the effect of majority rule in producing better 
outcomes, it is not necessary or even helpful to say that when the group decision 
counts, people are altruistic or less concerned with their self-interest. On the 
contrary, self-interest provides a fully adequate explanation of the people’s 
behavior. In the individual condition, it is sensible to care little about the 
accuracy of one’s signal to others; that is an informational externality142—
affecting others, for better or for worse, but not affecting one’s own likelihood of 
gain. If a subject’s individual signal misleads others, the subject has no reason to 
care. But under the majority rule condition that I have just described, the subject 
should care a great deal about producing an accurate signal, simply because an 
inaccurate signal will reduce the likelihood that the group will get it right. And 
here the subject need not care about the accuracy of his individual decision 
except insofar as that decision provides a helpful signal to the group. Hence it is 
only to be expected that cascades are reduced, and correct outcomes are 
increased, when people are rewarded for good group decisions.  
 
There is a general point here. It is individually rational, under plausible 
assumptions, to participate in a cascade; participants benefit themselves at the 
same time that they fail to benefit others (by failing to disclose privately held 
                                                 
140 Id. at 1515. 
141 Note that it takes quite sophisticated participants to see this point. 
142 See Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and 
Search, 108 Econ. J. 60, 61 (1998). 
34 
 information) or affirmatively harm others (by giving them the wrong signal). 
This claim holds even if conformity is not rewarded as such. By contrast, it is not 
rational, under plausible assumptions, to disclose or act upon private 
information, even though the disclosure or action will actually benefit others. 
The upshot is that dissenters, disclosing their own private information, need to 
be encouraged, simply because they confer benefits on those who observe them. 
If the point is put together with an emphasis on the risk of cascades on courts, 
there is fresh reason to appreciate judicial dissents, if only because they increase 
the likelihood that majority decisions will receive critical scrutiny. Note here that 
within the Supreme Court alone, dissenting opinions have frequently become the 
law, indeed have become the law on well over 130 occasions143—a point to which 
I will return. 
 
The upshot is that dissenters and nonconformists, disclosing their own 
private information, should be encouraged, simply because they confer benefits 
on those who observe them. Now let us put this point together with a 
recognition of the risk of cascades on courts. We can readily see a new reason to 
appreciate judicial dissents, if only because they increase the likelihood that 
majority decisions will receive critical scrutiny. Note here that within the 
Supreme Court alone, dissenting opinions have frequently become the law, 
indeed have become the law on well over 130 occasions144—a point to which I 
will return. 
 
This claim has an implication for appropriate institutional arrangements: 
Any system that creates incentives for individuals to reveal information to the 
group is likely to produce better outcomes. A system of majority rule, in which 
individuals known that their well-being will be promoted (or not) depending on 
the group’s decision, therefore has significant advantages. Well-functioning 
organizations, public as well as private, are likely to benefit from this insight. In 
this light, we might even offer a suggestion about the nature of civic 
responsibility: In case of doubt, citizens should reveal their private signal, rather 
than disguising that signal and agreeing with the crowd. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, this kind of behavior is not optimal from the point of view of 
the individual who seeks to get things right, but it is best from the point of view 
of a group or nation that seeks to use all relevant information.  
                                                 
143 Calculated on the basis of the list of overruled decisions in  
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/constitution/scourt.html. 
144 Calculated on the basis of the list of overruled decisions in  
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/constitution/scourt.html. 
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3. Disclosers, dissenters, and contrarians. It is important to make some 
distinctions here. The majority-rewarding variation on the urn experiment gives 
people an incentive to disclose accurate, privately-held information. This is the 
information from which the group benefits, and this is the information that does 
not emerge if people are rewarded for correct individual decisions. Full 
disclosure of accurate information is a central goal of institutional design.145 But 
the experiment does not suggest that a group is better off if people always 
disagree, or even if they always say what they think. In the tale of the Emperor’s 
New Clothes, the boy is not a skeptic or a malcontent. On the contrary, he is a 
particular kind of dissenter; he is a discloser, revealing the information that he 
actually holds. The majority-rewarding variation of the urn experiment 
encourages subjects to act like that boy.  
 
By contrast, we can imagine a different kind of person, a contrarian, who 
feels that he will be rewarded, financially or otherwise, simply for disagreeing 
with others. There is no reason to celebrate the contrarian. In many cases, 
contrarians are most unlikely to give any help to the group. If the contrarian is 
known as such, his signal will be very noisy and not very informative. If the 
contrarian is not known as such, he is still failing to disclose accurate 
information, and in that sense he is not helping the group to arrive at correct 
decisions. We could imagine a variation on the urn experiment in which a 
contrarian-confederate regularly announced the opposite of what his predecessor 
announced. It is safe to predict that such behavior would reduce cascades, but it 
would not reduce errors by individuals or groups. On the contrary, it would 
increase them. 
 
                                                 
145 I do not explore the possibility that institutions might encourage or discourage people to 
obtain information, which can then be disclosed to the group. Obviously a group will benefit if 
its members are provided with good incentives to provide valuable information. Such incentives 
are especially important if those who acquire information would otherwise incur all of the costs 
of search but only a fraction of the benefits. And since it can be costly to obtain information, there 
are tradeoffs to be made, for both individuals and groups, between the costs and benefits of 
search. Throughout the discussion I emphasize the simplest situations, in which conformity and 
cascades (along with group polarization) suppress accurate information that individuals already 
hold. So long as that information is valuable to the group, full disclosure is generally the ideal. I 
offer a brief discussion, see pp. infra, of the possibility that disclosure of accurate information will 
harm the group, perhaps because it introduces tension, perhaps because it produces 
embarrassment or worse. Much work remains to be done on the complex cases in which 
institutions seek to promote either the optimal level of search or the optimal level of disclosure 
when disclosure produces both benefits and harms. 
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 Dissenters who are disclosers, then, are to be prized. This is certainly if 
they are disclosing the full truth about the issue at hand, and also if they are 
revealing accurate information, bearing on that issue, that they actually hold. By 
contrast, dissenters who are contrarians are at best a mixed blessing. And we can 
also imagine dissenters who do not disclose a missing fact, but instead simply 
state a point of view that would otherwise be missing from group discussion. 
Such dissenters might urge, for example, that animals should have rights, or that 
school prayer should be permitted, or that the law should allow homosexual 
marriage, or that capital punishment should be banned. In the domains of 
politics and law, cascade-type behavior typically leads people to be silent not 
about facts, but about points of view. It is obvious that a group needs relevant 
facts; does it need to know about privately held opinions as well?  
 
There are two reasons that it does. First, those opinions are of independent 
interest. If most or many people favor school prayer, or believe that capital 
punishment is morally unacceptable, it is valuable to know that fact. Other 
things being equal, both individuals and governments do better if they know 
what their fellow citizens really think. Second, people with dissenting opinions 
might well have good arguments. It is important for those who conform, or fall 
into a cascade, or independently concur to hear those arguments. This is a 
standard Millian point,146 to which I will shortly return. Judge Richard Posner 
suggests that judges often offer a “go along concurrence,”147 joining the majority 
though they privately disagree. Such judges give a false signal about their actual 
opinions and, very possibly, their future votes.  
 
4. Conformity and reputation. Suppose that people are rewarded not only 
or not mostly for being correct, but also or mostly for doing what other people 
do. The reward might be material, in the form of more cash or improved 
prospects, or it might be non-material, in the form of more and better 
relationships. In the real world, people are often punished for nonconformity 
and rewarded for conformity. Someone who rejects the views of leaders or of the 
majority, might well find himself less likely to be promoted and more likely to be 
disliked. Organizations, groups, and governments often prize harmony, and 
nonconformists tend to introduce disharmony. Sometimes it is more important to 
be “on the team” than to be right. “Sometimes cultural groups adopt very high 
levels of norm enforcement that severely suppress the individual variations, 
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 innovations, and ‘errors’ that innate cultural transmission mechanisms require to 
generate adaptive evolutionary processes within groups.”148 
 
The likely result should be clear. If rewards come to those who conform, 
cascade-like behavior will increase, simply because the incentive to be correct is 
strengthened or replaced by the incentive to do what others do. The extent of this 
effect will depend on the extent of the incentive to conform. But whenever the 
incentive is positive, people will be all the more likely to ignore their private 
information and to follow others. The opposite result should be expected if 
people are penalized for following others or rewarded for independence; if so, 
cascade-like behavior should be reduced or even eliminated. I am now 
emphasizing the incentive to conform, but in some settings independence is 
prized, and I will offer a few remarks on that possibility below. 
 
If conformity is rewarded, the problem is especially severe for the earliest 
disclosers or dissenters, who “may bear especially high costs because they are 
conspicuous, individually identified, and easy to isolate for reprisals.”149 And if 
the earliest dissenters are successfully deterred, dissent is likely to be exceedingly 
rare. But once the number of disclosers or dissenters reaches a certain level, there 
may be a tipping point, producing a massive change in behavior.150 Indeed a 
single discloser, or a single skeptic, might be able to initiate a chain of events by 
which a myth is shattered. Return to the tale of the Emperor’s New Clothes: “A 
child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as his eyes 
showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The Emperor is naked,’ he said. . . 
. [T]he boy's remark, which had been heard by the bystanders, was repeated over 
and over again until everyone cried: ‘The boy is right! The Emperor is naked! It's 
true!’”151 But it might be very difficult to initiate this process, especially if early 
disclosers are subject to social or legal sanctions. Here we can see a potentially 
beneficial role of misfits and malcontents, who should perform a valuable 
function in getting otherwise neglected material and perspectives to others. 
Consider the suggestion that extremely harmful cultural effects result from a 
“social structure” that eliminates “valuable innovators, experimenters, and error-
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 makers from being viewed as people to copy.”152 The qualification, noted above, 
is that regular contrarians might reduce cascades without reducing errors.153 
 
a. An experiment. With respect to conformity, these speculations are 
supported by an ingenious variation on the urn experiment mentioned above.154 
In this experiment, people were paid twenty-five cents for a correct decision, but 
seventy-five cents for a decision that matched the decision of the majority of the 
group. There were punishments for incorrect and nonconforming answers as 
well. If people made an incorrect decision, they lost twenty-five cents; if their 
decision failed to match the group’s decision, they lost seventy-five cents.  
 
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time. No fewer 
than 96.7% of rounds resulted in cascades,155 and 35.3% of announcements did 
not match the announcer’s private signal, that is, the signal given by his own 
draw.156 And when the draw of a subsequent person contradicted the 
announcement of the predecessor, 72.2% of people matched the first 
announcement. Consider, as a dramatic illustration, this period of the 
experiment157 (the actual urn for this period was B): 
 
Conformity Experiment 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Private 
Draw 
a b b b a b b b a b 
Decision A A A A A A A A A A 
 
 
b. Affective ties and stifled dissent. The lesson is that institutions that 
reward conformity, and punish deviance, are far more likely to produce worse 
decisions and to reveal less in the way of private information. And here there is a 
link to the earlier suggestion that serious mistakes are committed by groups 
whose members are connected by bonds of affection, friendship, and 
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 solidarity.158 In such groups, members are usually less willing, or even unwilling, 
to state objections and counterarguments, for fear that these will violate 
generally held norms. Cascades and bad decisions are likely; return to the 
investment clubs discussed above.159 We can see here that an organization that 
depends on affective ties is likely to stifle dissent and to minimize the disclosure 
of private information and belief; some religious and political organizations are 
obvious illustrations. A socially destructive norm of conformity aggravates 
people’s tendency to ignore their private information and to say and do what 
others do.  
 
If an organization wants to avoid error, it should make clear that it 
welcomes the disclosure private signals, simply because that is in the 
organization’s own general interest. This point might seem counterintuitive, 
because in most well-functioning societies, conformity to the majority’s view 
seems to be the civil thing to do. What I am suggesting here is that from the 
social standpoint, it is better to behave in the way that one would if being right 
were all that mattered, and better still to behave as one would if a correct group 
decision were all that mattered. 
 
Of course the normative issues are not simple. Bonds of affection and 
solidarity are often important to group members, and many people do not 
appreciate dissent and disagreement. Perhaps the real point of the relevant 
group or organization is not to perform well, but to foster good relationships. 
Conformists avoid creating the difficulties that come from contestation, but at the 
expense, often, of a good outcome; dissenters tend to increase contestation while 
also improving performance.160 In the abstract, it is hard to specify the optimal 
tradeoffs between the various goods. If the central goal of group members is to 
maintain and improve social bonds and not to carry out some task, conformity 
might be encouraged, at least if nonconformists introduce tension and hostility. 
Or consider the question of dissent in wartime. It is important for those who 
wage war to know what citizens really think and also to have a sense of actual 
and potential errors. But it is also important, especially in wartime, for citizens to 
have a degree of solidarity and to believe that they are involved in a common 
endeavor; this belief can help solve collective action problems that otherwise 
threaten success. Some forms of dissent might correct mistakes while also 
undermining social bonds. Of course freedom of speech should be the rule, but 
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 there is no simple solution to this dilemma. We might simply notice that those 
who are inclined to dissent must decide whether it is worthwhile to create the 
disruption that comes from expressing their views.161 
 
c. When silence is golden. I have been stressing cases in which disclosure 
is in the group’s interest, but the immediately preceding discussion suggests the 
opposite possibility.162 If group members reveal information that is embarrassing 
or worse, they might assist a competitor or an adversary. They might also make 
it harder for the group to have candid discussions in the future, simply because 
everyone knows that whatever is said might be made public. Strong norms 
against “leaking” are a natural corrective. And if some members of the group 
have engaged in wrongdoing, revelation of that fact might injure many or all 
group members. Anyone who has ever attended a faculty meeting is aware of the 
possibility that speakers receive the full benefits of the time they use, while 
inflicting costs on others; this unfortunate state of affairs can lead to unduly long 
meetings. The same problem can inflict the deliberations of both legislatures and 
courts. Conformity to a group norm, involving silence or informal time 
constraints, can be extremely valuable.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that the problem I am emphasizing—the 
failure to disclose accurate information that will benefit the public—is closely 
paralleled by the problems raised in many cases in which silence, not revelation, 
is a collective good.163 And if disclosure will spread inaccurate information, it is 
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 unlikely to be beneficial,164 especially if it negates the beneficial effects of 
previous decisions or produces a cascade of its own. Because my focus is on the 
failure to disclose information, I will not devote attention to situations in which 
silence is golden, except to note that the basic analysis of those situations is not 
so different from the analysis here.165 
 
d. Variations and the real world. The conformity experiment could itself 
be varied in many ways, with predictable results. If financial rewards were solely 
or almost solely for conformity, cascade behavior would be increased; if the 
seventy-five cent reward were cut in half, cascade behavior should decline. Of 
course it is possible to imagine many mixed systems. An obvious example is a 
system of majority rule in which people are also rewarded for conformity or 
punished for nonconformity. Will cascades develop in such cases? The answer 
will depend on the size of the various incentives. If the accuracy of the group’s 
decision will greatly affect individual well-being—if their lives depend on good 
results—cascades are less likely. But if the ultimate outcome has little effect, and 
if conformity will carry high rewards, cascades are inevitable. A system in which 
individuals receive $2 for a correct majority decision, and $.25 for conforming, 
will produce different (and better) results from a system in which individuals 
receive $.25 for a correct majority decision, and $2 for conformity.  
 
The real world of groups and democracy offers countless variations on 
these rewards, and often the rewards are highly indeterminate; people do not 
know what they are or have a hard time in quantifying them. But there can be 
little doubt that conformity pressures actually result in less disclosure of 
information. Consider the suggestion of a medical researcher who questions a 
number of Lyme disease diagnoses: “Doctors can’t say what they think anymore. 
. . . If you quote me as saying these things, I’m as good as dead.”166 When 
privately interviewed, gang members express considerable discomfort about 
their antisocial behavior, but their own conduct suggests a full commitment, 
leading to a widespread belief that most people approve of what is being done.167 
Or consider the remarks of a sociologist who has publicly raised questions about 
the health threats posed by mad-cow disease, suggesting that if you raise those 
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 doubts publicly, “You get made to feel like a pedophile.”168 Tocqueville 
explained the decline of the French church, in the mid-eighteenth century, in 
these terms: “Those who retained their beliefs in the doctrines of the Church . . . 
dreading isolation more than error, professed to share the sentiments of the 
majority. So what was in reality the opinion of only a part . . . of the nation came 
to be regarded as the will of all and for this reason seemed irresistible, even to 
those who had given it this false appearance.”169 Or consider, as a chilling 
example, the suggestion from a killer of Mostar, during the Bosniar war, that his 
actions were not a product of his convictions about the evil character of those he 
was killing. On the contrary, many of them were his former friends. His 
explanation was that he had to do what he did to remain a part of his Serbian 
community.170  
 
There is a final wrinkle. In the settings discussed thus far, dissenters 
proceed at their peril and nonconformity is punished. This will be my emphasis 
throughout. But in some contexts, dissenters might be attempting to improve 
their own prospects, and dissenting might be a sensible way of doing that. A 
political dissenter, challenging some widespread practice, sometimes becomes 
more prominent and more successful as a result. A judge who dissents in a high-
profile case might not greatly fear that her reputation will be harmed; on the 
contrary, she might think that the dissent will redound to her benefit. The point 
is strengthened once we consider the fact that a society consists of countless 
communities with a wide range of values and beliefs. A public dissenter might 
impair his reputation in one group but simultaneously strengthen it in another. 
Of course, some people say and do exactly what they think and do not greatly 
care about their reputations; for them, informational influences are far more 
important. The only suggestions are that much of the time, people do not want to 
lose the good opinion of relevant others, and that the result of this desire is to 
reduce the information that the public is able to have. 
 
e. Beyond information. Often people lack much information, strictly 
speaking, but they do have preferences and values. They might believe that the 
words “under God” should not be included in the pledge of allegiance. They 
might want to discontinue affirmative action. But in either case they might not 
reveal what they want, simply because of the pressure to conform. I have 
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 suggested that from the standpoint of democratic practice, this is a problem as 
well. Most of the time, it is valuable for people to disclose what they want and 
what they value. The basic findings as in the urn experiments would 
undoubtedly be the same for preferences and values as well as facts, with 
rewards for conformity greatly increasing the apparent (not real) degree of 
agreement.  
 
This point helps explain why “[u]npopular or dysfunctional norms may 
survive even in the presence of a huge, silent majority of dissenters.”171 Fearing 
the wrath of others, people might not publicly contest practices and values that 
they privately abhor. The practice of sexual harassment long predated the idea of 
sexual harassment, and the innumerable women who were subject to harassment 
did not like it.172 But much of the time they were silent, largely because they 
feared the consequences of public complaint. It is interesting to speculate about 
the possibility that many current practices fall in the same general category: 
those that produce harm, and are known to produce harm, but that persist 
because most of those who are harmed believe that they will suffer if they object 
in public. 
 
C. Reputational Cascades 
 
If conformity pressures are taken seriously, we can see the possibility of 
reputational cascades, parallel to their informational sibling.173 In a reputational 
cascade, people think that they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, 
but they nonetheless go along with the crowd. Even the most confident people 
sometimes fall prey to this process, silencing themselves in the process. In fact 
the conformity-rewarding version of the urn experiment is an elegant example of 
a reputational cascade. It is thus possible to exploit the influence of peer 
pressure, found in the conformity experiments, to show how many social 
movements become possible.  
 
1. Mechanics. Suppose that Albert suggests that global warming is a 
serious problem, and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she actually 
agrees with Albert, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, to be 
ignorant or indifferent to human suffering and environmental protection. If 
Albert and Barbara agree that global warming is a serious problem, Cynthia 
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 might not contradict them publicly, and might even seem to share their 
judgment, not because she believes the judgment to be correct, but because she 
does not want to face the hostility or lose the good opinion of others. It is easy to 
see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert, Barbara, and 
Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be most 
reluctant to contradict them even if he thinks that they are wrong. In the actual 
world of group decisions, people are of course uncertain whether publicly 
expressed statements are a product of independent knowledge, participation in 
an informational cascade, or reputational pressure. It is reasonable to think that 
much of the time, listeners and observers overstate the extent to which the 
actions of others are based on independent information. 
 
Reputational cascades occur within all branches of government. Of course 
legislators are vulnerable to reputational pressures; that is part of their job. When 
elected representatives suddenly support legislation to deal with an apparent 
(sometimes not real) crisis, they are involved in a reputational cascade.174 
Consider, for example, the rush, in July 2002, to enact measures to deal with 
corporate corruption.175 Undoubtedly many legislators had private qualms about 
the very legislation that they supported, and some of them probably 
disapproved of measures for which they nonetheless voted. So too with the 
unanimous (!) disapproval, by members of the United States Senate, of the court 
of appeals decision to strike down the use of the words “under God” in the 
pledge of allegiance. 176 In both cases, some legislators were involved in a 
reputational cascade, repressing their private doubts in order to avoid injury to 
their reputations.  
 
2. Pluralistic ignorance and self-censorship. I have emphasized that in an 
informational cascade, the most serious problem is that the group fails to receive 
privately held information. Exactly the same problem arises in a reputational 
cascade, where the public, for a very different reason, is unable to learn what 
many people know and think. Here people silence themselves not because they 
believe that they are wrong but because they do not want to face the disapproval 
that, they think, would follow from expressing the view that they believe to be 
correct. The underlying problem here is pluralistic ignorance: ignorance, on the 
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 part of most or all, of what most people actually think.177 In the face of pluralistic 
ignorance, people can assume, wrongly, that others have a certain view, and they 
alter their statements and actions accordingly. 
 
Under certain conditions, this self-censorship is an extremely serious 
social loss. For example, Communism was able to sustain itself in Eastern 
Europe, not only because of force, but because people believed, wrongly, that 
most people supported the existing regime.178 The fall of Communism was made 
possible only by the disclosure of privately held views, which turned pluralistic 
ignorance into something closer to pluralistic knowledge.179 As we shall see, self-
censoring can undermine success during war.180 Reputational pressures also help 
fuel ethnic identifications, sometimes producing high levels of hostility among 
groups for which, merely a generation before, such identifications were 
unimportant and hostility was barely imaginable.181 And if certain views are 
punished, it is possible that unpopular views will eventually be lost to public 
debate, so that what was once “unthinkable” is now “unthought.”182 Views that 
were originally taboo, and offered rarely or not at all, become excised entirely, 
simply because they have not been heard. Here too those who do not care about 
their reputation, and who say what they really think, perform a valuable public 
service, often at their own expense.183  
 
Various civil liberties, including freedom of speech, can be seen as an 
effort to insulate people from the pressure to conform, and the reason is not only 
to protect private rights, but also to protect the public against the risk of self-
silencing. A striking claim by Joseph Raz clarifies the point: “If I were to choose 
between living in a society which enjoys freedom of expression, but not having 
the right myself, or enjoying the right in a society which does not have it, I would 
have no hesitation in judging that my own personal interest is better served by 
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 the first option.”184 The claim makes sense in light of the fact that a system of free 
speech confers countless benefits on people who do not much care about 
exercising that right. Consider the fact that in the history of the world, no society 
with democratic elections and free speech has ever experienced a famine185—a 
demonstration of the extent in which political liberty protects people who do not 
exercise it. Freedom of association is especially noteworthy here, because it 
allows people to band together in groups in which the ordinary incentive to 
conform might be absent or even reversed. Society in general might punish 
certain political views, but associations can be found in which those views are 
tolerated or even encouraged. The secret ballot can be seen in related terms.186 
One advantage of the secret ballot is that it reduces informational pressures, 
leading the voter to express his own preference and to be less influenced by the 
views of others. (Recall the majority-rewarding version of the urn experiment.) 
But the more obvious advantage is that the voter can act anonymously and thus 
cast his ballot without fear of opprobrium. 
 
Just as informational cascades may be limited in their reach, there can be 
local reputational cascades—ones that reshape the public pronouncements of 
particular subgroups without affecting those of the broader society. When certain 
subgroups believe that nonexistent risks are actually quite serious, or that some 
hopeless medical treatment produces miracle cures, reputational cascades might 
well be involved, simply because skeptics do not speak out. Of course 
informational influences interact with reputational ones. South Africa, for 
example, has experienced the literally deadly phenomenon of “AIDS denial,” 
with prominent leaders suggesting that AIDS is not a real disease, but instead a 
conspiracy to sell certain drugs to poor people. In that case, a cascade did 
develop, but it was based mostly on transmission of alleged facts, not on fear of 
reputational harm.187 But if we emphasize reputational pressures, we can identity 
an important reason for unusual beliefs—about facts and values—among various 
communities of like-minded people. It is often tempting to attribute such 
differences to deep historical or cultural factors, but the real source, much of the 
time, is reputational pressure.  
 
Of course political leaders often play an important role in building those 
pressures.188 If leaders insist that something is true, or that the nation should 
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 pursue a certain course of action, some citizens might well be reluctant to 
dissent, if only because of a fear of public disapproval. Here as elsewhere, the 
result can be a serious social loss. And here again a strong system of civil 
liberties, and an insistence on making safe space for enclaves of dissenters, can be 
justified not as an effort to protect individual rights, but as a safeguard against 
social blunders. A market system aggregates and spreads information better than 
any planner could possibly do.189 In the same way, a system of free expression 
and dissent protects against the false confidence and the inevitable mistakes of 
planners, both private and public.  
 
It would make little sense to say that cascades, in general, are good or bad. 
Sometimes cascade effects will overcome group or public torpor, by generating 
concern about serious though previously ignored problems. Sometimes cascade 
effects will make people far more worried than they would otherwise be and 
produce large-scale distortions in private judgments, public policy, and law. It is 
reasonable to speculate that the antislavery movement had distinctive cascade-
like features, as did the environmental movement in the United States, the fall of 
Communism,190 and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; so too with 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution and the rise of Nazism in Germany. Typically 
cascades are quite fragile, precisely because people’s commitments are based on 
little private information. What I have emphasized here is the serious risk that 
social cascades can lead to widespread errors, factual or otherwise. 
 
D. Boundedly Rational Cascades 
 
Thus far the discussion has assumed that people are largely rational—that 
they take account, rationally, of the information provided by the statements and 
actions of others, and that they care, sensibly enough, about their reputation. The 
principal exception, suggested above, is that people may mistake a cascade for a 
large number of independent decisions. But it is well-known that human beings 
are “boundedly rational.” In most domains, people use heuristics, or mental 
short-cuts, and they also show identifiable biases.191 Indeed, following others can 
itself be seen as a heuristic, one that usually works well, but that also misfires in 
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 some cases.192 And for other heuristics and for every bias, there is a 
corresponding possibility of a cascade. 
 
Consider, for example, the availability heuristic, which has probably 
become the most well-known in law.193 When people use the availability 
heuristic, they answer a hard question about probability by asking whether 
examples come readily to mind.194 How likely is a flood, an earthquake, an 
airplane crash, a traffic jam, a terrorist attack, or a disaster at a nuclear power 
plant? Lacking statistical knowledge, people try to think of illustrations.195 For 
people without statistical knowledge—which is to say most people—it is hardly 
irrational to use the availability heuristic. The problem is that this heuristic can 
lead to serious errors of fact, in the form of excessive fear of small risks and 
neglect of large ones.196 And indeed both surveys and actual behavior show 
extensive use of the availability heuristic. Whether people will buy insurance for 
natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences.197 If floods have not 
occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely 
to purchase insurance.198 In the aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for 
earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines steadily from that point, as vivid 
memories recede.199  
 
For present purposes, the key point is that the availability heuristic does 
not operate in a social vacuum. Whether an incident is “available” is a function 
of social interactions. These interactions rapidly spread salient illustrations 
within relevant communities, making those illustrations available to many or 
most. Should swimmers worry about shark attacks?200 Are young girls likely to 
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 be abducted?201 In both cases, the United States has recently seen “availability 
cascades,”202 in which salient examples were rapidly spread from one person to 
the next. Note that this process typically involves information. If some people 
use a recent assault to show that there is a serious risk of crime ten blocks north, 
or a recent airplane accident to show that it is unsafe to fly, their statements carry 
a certain authority, leading others to believe that they are true. And in the case of 
shark attacks and abduction of young girls, the media spread a few gripping 
examples, apparently providing information that was rapidly transmitted to 
millions of people. But reputational forces play a role as well. Much of the time, 
people are reluctant to say that an example is misleading and hence that others’ 
fears are groundless. Efforts at correction may suggest stupidity or callousness, 
and a desire to avoid public opprobrium may produce a form of silencing.  
 
Availability cascades are ubiquitous. Vivid examples, alongside social 
interactions, help account for decisions to purchase insurance against natural 
disasters.203 Cascade effects explain the existence of widespread public concern 
about abandoned hazardous waste dumps (a relatively trivial environmental 
hazard).204 In more recent years, availability cascades spurred public fears not 
only of shark attacks and abductions of girls, but also of the pesticide Alar, of 
plane crashes, and of shootings in schools in the aftermath of the murders in 
Littleton, Colorado.205 Such effects helped produce massive dislocations in beef 
production in Europe in connection with “mad cow disease”206; they help also to 
account for the outpouring of enthusiasm for regulation of accounting practices 
in the aftermath of the 2001 scandal involving Enron and other corporations.207  
My suggestion is not that in all or most of these cases, availability cascades led to 
excessive or inappropriate reactions. On the contrary, such cascades sometimes 
have the valuable effect of promoting public attention to serious but neglected 
problems. The suggestion is only that the intensity of public reactions is best 
understood by seeing the interaction between the availability heuristic and the 
                                                 
201 See Howard Kurtz, The 'Crime Wave' Against Girls, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35380-2002Aug2.html: “Could the saturation 
coverage be painting a distorted picture, like the great shark scare last summer?. . . [T]ake these 
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manuscript 2001). 
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 cascade effects I have been emphasizing.208 The problem is that those interactions 
make some errors inevitable, simply because a heuristic, even if generally 
helpful, is bound to misfire in many cases. Here as elsewhere, dissent can be an 
important corrective. For organizations and governments, the question is how to 
make dissent less costly, or even to reward it, especially when dissenters benefit 
not themselves, but others. 
 
IV. Group Polarization 
 
Thus far I have been exploring how informational and reputational 
influences produce conformity and cascades. I have also identified factors that 
can increase or reduce the likelihood of both of these. When people are not 
bound by affective ties, the magnitude of both influences diminishes. When 
people define themselves as opposed to the relevant others, the direction of the 
influence might even shift. Greater information of course reduces the effects, and 
when people know that certain people are more informed, cascades are 
shattered. With these points in view, let us now turn to the phenomenon of 
group polarization, a phenomenon that contains large lessons about the behavior 
of interest groups, religious organizations, political parties, juries, legislatures, 
judicial panels, and even nations.209 
                                                 
208 There is an interesting puzzle for those interested in the real-world uses of availability 
heuristic: In many contexts, multiple images are literally “available.” Consider the problem of 
gun violence. It is not hard to find cases in which the presence of guns led to many deaths, and 
also cases in which the presence of guns allowed law-abiding citizens to protect themselves 
against criminals. See Donald Braman and Dan M. Kahan, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A 
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions (unpublished manuscript 2002). In the face of 
conflicting instances, which cases are especially available, and to whom? The same question can 
be raised in the environmental setting. We can find cases in which serious harm resulted from a 
failure to heed early warnings, suggesting the need for aggressive regulatory protection against 
risks that cannot yet be shown to be serious; but we can also find cases in which the government 
expended a great deal to reduce risks that turned out, on reflection, to be small or illusory. The 
former cases are available to some people and the latter to others. Why should one or another 
kind of case be available? The behavior of the media, and of relevant interest groups, is 
undoubtedly important here, but it does not provide all of the picture. Beliefs and orientations 
are a product of availability, to be sure; but what is available is also a product of beliefs and 
orientations. In other words, availability may be endogenous to individual predispositions. 
People are often predisposed to take one or another case as an illustration of a general 
phenomenon, and predispositions matter a great deal in determining what is available. A great 
deal of work remains to be done on this topic. 
209 I have discussed group polarization in more detail elsewhere, see Sunstein, Deliberative 
Trouble, supra note, and stress here those aspects of group polarization that are most important 
for an understanding of the importance of dissent. 
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A. The Basic Phenomenon 
 
What happens within deliberating bodies? Do groups compromise? Do 
they move toward the middle of the tendencies of their individual members? The 
answer is now clear, and it is perhaps not what intuition would suggest: 
Members of a deliberating group end up in a more extreme position in line with 
their tendencies before deliberation began.210 This is the phenomenon known as 
group polarization. Group polarization is the typical pattern with deliberating 
groups, having been found in hundreds of studies involving over a dozen 
countries, including the United States, France, and Germany.211 
 
It follows that a group of people who think that global warming is a 
serious problem will, after discussion, think that global warming is a very 
serious problem; that those who approve of an ongoing war effort will, as a 
result of discussion, become still more enthusiastic about that effort; that people 
who dislike the Rehnquist Court will dislike it quite intensely after talking with 
one another; that people who disapprove of the United States, and are suspicious 
of its intentions, will increase their disapproval and suspicion if they exchange 
points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of the latter phenomenon 
among citizens of France.212 When like-minded people talk with one another, 
they usually end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought 
before they started to talk. It should be readily apparent that enclaves of people, 
inclined to rebellion or even violence, might move sharply in that direction as a 
                                                 
210 See Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition 203-226 (1985). At first glance, group 
polarization might be seen to be in tension with the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which holds that 
when people are answering a common question with two answers, one false and one true, and 
when the average probability that each voter will answer correctly exceeds 50%, the probability 
of a correct answers, by a majority of the group, increases to certainty as the size of the group 
increases. For a good overview, see Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem, 31 J Legal Stud. 327, 329-334 (2002). The importance of the theorem lies in the 
demonstration that groups are likely to do better than individuals, and large groups better than 
small ones, if majority rule is used and if each person is more likely than not to be correct. But 
when group polarization is involved, individuals do not make judgments on their own; they are 
influenced by the judgments of others. When interdependent judgments are being made, and 
when some people are wrong, it is not at all clear that groups will do better than individuals. For 
empirical evidence, see Norbert Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and 
Groups, 103 Psych. Rev. 687 (1996). On some of the theoretical issues, see David Austen-Smith, 
and J.S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 
American Political Science Review 34 (1996).  
211 See id. at 204. 
212 Id. at 224. 
52 
 consequence of internal deliberations. Political extremism is often a product of 
group polarization.213 
 
There is a close relationship between group polarization and cascade 
effects. Both of these are a product of informational and reputational influences. 
A key difference is that group polarization refers to the effects of deliberation,214 
and cascades typically do not involve discussion at all. In addition, group 
polarization does not necessarily involve a cascade-like process. Polarization can 
result simply from simultaneous independent decisions, by all or most 
individuals, to move toward a more extreme point in line with the tendencies of 
group members. 
 
To see the operation of group polarization in a legal context, let us explore 
in more detail the study of punitive intentions and punitive damage awards, 
referred to above.215 The study involved about 3000 jury-eligible citizens; its 
major purpose was to determine how individuals would be influenced by seeing 
and discussing the punitive intentions of others. Hence subjects were asked to 
record, in advance of deliberation, a “punishment judgment” on a scale of 0 to 8, 
where 0 indicated that the defendant should not be punished at all, and 8 
indicated that the defendant should be punished extremely severely. After the 
individual judgments were recorded, jurors were sorted into six-person groups 
and asked to deliberate to a unanimous “punishment verdict.” It would be 
reasonable to predict that the verdicts of juries would be the median of 
punishment judgments of jurors; but the prediction would be badly wrong.  
 
Instead the effect of deliberation was to create both a severity shift for 
high-punishment jurors and a leniency shift for low-punishment jurors.216 When 
the median judgment of individual jurors was four or more on the eight-point 
scale, the jury’s verdict was above that median judgment.217 Consider, for 
example, a case involving a man who nearly drowned on a defectively 
constructed yacht. Jurors tended to be outraged by the idea of a defectively built 
yacht, and groups were significantly more outraged than their median 
                                                 
213 See Albert Breton and Silvana Dalmazzone, Information Control, Loss of Autonomy, and the 
Emergence of Political Extremism 53-55 (Albert Bretton et al. eds. 2002). 
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Robert Baron et al., supra note, at 74. 
215 See Schkade et al., supra note. 
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 members.218 But when the median judgment of individual jurors was below four, 
the jury’s verdict was typically below that median judgment.219 Consider a case 
involving a shopper who was injured in a fall when an escalator suddenly 
stopped.220 Individual jurors were not greatly bothered by the incident, seeing it 
as a genuine accident rather than a case of serious wrongdoing; and jurors were 
more lenient than individual jurors.221 Here, then, is a clear example of group 
polarization in action. Groups whose members were antecedently inclined to 
impose large punishments become inclined toward larger punishments. The 
opposite effect was found with groups whose members were inclined toward 
small punishments. 
 
B. Outrage 
 
When we consider the ingredients of punishment judgments, this finding 
has a large implication for people’s behavior both inside and outside the 
courtroom. Punishment judgments are rooted in outrage,222 and a group’s 
outrage, on a bounded scale, is an excellent predictor of the same group’s 
punishment judgments, on the same scale.223 Apparently people who begin with 
a high level of outrage become still more outraged as a result of group 
discussion. Moreover, the degree of the shift depends on the antecedent level of 
outrage; the higher the original level, the greater the shift as a result of internal 
deliberations.224 There is a point here about the well-springs of not only of severe 
punishment by jurors, mobs, and governments, but also of rebellion and 
violence.225 If like-minded people, predisposed to be outraged, are put together 
with one another, significant changes are to be expected.  
 
It should be easy to see that group polarization is inevitably at work in 
feuds, ethnic and international strife, and war. One of the characteristic features 
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222 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide 32-33 (2002). 
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 of feuds is that members of feuding groups tend to talk only to one another, 
fueling and amplifying their outrage, and solidifying their impression of the 
relevant events. Group polarization occurs every day within Israel and among 
the Palestinian Authority. Many social movements, both good and bad, become 
possible through the heightened effects of outrage226; consider the movement for 
rights for deaf people, which was greatly enhanced by the fact that the deaf have 
a degree of geographical isolation.227  
 
C. Hidden Profiles and Self-Silencing in Groups 
 
The tendency toward extreme movement is the most noteworthy finding 
in the literature on group polarization.228 But there is a neglected point, of special 
importance for my argument here: In a deliberating group, those with a minority 
position often silence themselves or otherwise have disproportionately little 
weight. The result can be “hidden profiles”—important information that is not 
shared within the group.229 Group members often have information but do not 
discuss it, and the result is to produce inferior decisions.  
 
Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both face-to-
face and online.230 The purpose of the study was to see how groups might 
collaborate to make personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates, applying 
for a marketing manager position, were placed before the groups. The attributes 
of the candidates were rigged by the experimenters so that one applicant was 
clearly the best for the job described. Packets of information were given to 
subjects, each containing a subset of information from the resumes, so that each 
group member had only part of the relevant information. The groups consisted 
of three people, some operating face-to-face, some operating on-line. Two results 
were especially striking. First, group polarization was common, as groups ended 
up in a more extreme position in accordance with the original thinking of their 
members. Second, almost none of the deliberating groups made what was 
conspicuously the right choice, because they failed to share information in a way 
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 that would permit the group to make an objective decision. Members tended to 
share positive information about the winning candidate and negative 
information about the losers, while also suppressing negative information about 
the winner and positive information about the losers. Their statements served to 
“reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add complications and 
fuel debate.”231  
 
This finding is in line with the more general suggestion that groups tend 
to dwell on shared information and to neglect information that is held by few 
members. It should be unnecessary to emphasize that this tendency can lead to 
large errors.232 To understand this particular point, it is necessary to explore the 
mechanisms that produce group polarization. 
 
D. Why Polarization? Some Explanations 
 
Why do like-minded people go to extremes? There are several reasons.233 
 
1. Information. The most important, involving informational influences, is 
similar to what we have found in connection with conformity and cascades. The 
simple idea here is that people respond to the arguments made by other 
people—and the “argument pool,” in any group with some initial disposition in 
one direction, will inevitably be skewed toward that disposition.234 A group 
whose members tend to think that Israel is the real aggressor in the Mideast 
conflict will tend to hear many arguments to that effect, and relatively few 
opposing views. It is inevitable that the group’s members will have heard some, 
but not all, of the arguments that emerge from the discussion. Having heard all 
of what is said, there is likely to be further movement in the anti-Israel direction. 
So too with a group whose members tend to oppose affirmative action: Group 
members will hear a large number of arguments against affirmative action and a 
fewer number of arguments on its behalf. If people are listening, they will have a 
stronger conviction, in the same direction from which they began, as a result of 
deliberation. An emphasis on limited argument pools also helps to explain the 
problem of “hidden profiles” and the greater discussion of shared information 
during group discussion. It is simply a statistical fact that when more people 
have a piece of information, there is a greater probability that it will be 
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 mentioned.235 Hidden profiles are a predictable result, to the detriment of the 
ultimate decision. 
 
2. Confidence and corroboration. The second explanation begins by noting 
that people with extreme views tend to have more confidence that they are right, 
and that as people gain confidence, they become more extreme in their beliefs. 236 
The intuition here is simple: People who lack confidence, and who are unsure 
what they should think, tend to moderate their views. It is for this reason that 
cautious people, not knowing what to do, are likely to choose the midpoint 
between relevant extremes.237 But if other people seem to share your view, you 
are likely to become more confident that you are correct—and hence to move in a 
more extreme direction. In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people’s 
opinions have been shown to become more extreme simply because their view 
has been corroborated, and because they have been more confident after learning 
of the shared views of others.238 Note that there is an obvious connection between 
this explanation and the finding, mentioned above, that a panel of three judges of 
the same party is likely to behave quite differently from a panel with only two 
such judges. The existence of unanimous confirmation, from two others, will 
strengthen confidence and hence strengthen extremity.239 
 
3. Social comparison. A third explanation, involving social comparison, 
begins with the claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other group 
members, and also to perceive themselves favorably.240 Their views may, to a 
greater or lesser extent, be a function of how they want to present themselves. 
Once people hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction 
of the dominant position, to hold onto their preserved self-presentation. They 
may want to signal, for example, that they are not cowardly or cautious, 
especially in an entrepreneurial group that disparages these characteristics, and 
hence they will frame their position so that they do not appear as such by 
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 comparison to other group members.241 And when they hear what other people 
think, they might find that they occupy a somewhat different position, in relation 
to the group, from what they hoped; and they shift accordingly.242  
 
For example, if people believe that they are somewhat more opposed to 
capital punishment than most people, they might shift a bit after finding 
themselves in a group of people who are strongly opposed to capital 
punishment, to maintain their preferred self-presentation. The phenomenon 
appears to occur in many contexts.243 People may wish, for example, not to seem 
too enthusiastic, or too restrained in their enthusiasm for, affirmative action, 
feminism, or an increase in national defense; hence their views may shift when 
they see what other group members think. The result is to press the group’s 
position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce shifts in individual 
members. There is a great deal of support for this account of group 
polarization.244 
 
Note that an emphasis on social comparison gives a new and perhaps 
better explanation for the existence of hidden profiles and the failure to share 
certain information within a group. People might emphasize shared views and 
information, and downplay unusual perspectives and new evidence, simply 
from a fear of group rejection and a desire for general approval.245 In political and 
legal institutions, there is an unfortunate implication: Group members who care 
about one another’s approval, or who depend upon one another for material or 
nonmaterial benefits, might well suppress highly relevant information. Hence 
this account of group polarization is connected with the idea of reputational 
cascades, where blunders are highly probable.  
 
E. Skewed Debates 
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 In the context of punitive damage awards by juries, a particular finding 
deserves emphasis.246 Thus far my discussion of the relevant study has stressed 
how deliberation affected punitive intentions, measured on a bounded numerical 
scale. But jurors were also asked to record their dollar judgments, in advance of 
deliberation, and then to deliberate to dollar verdicts. Did high awards go up 
and low awards go down, as the idea of group polarization might predict? Not 
quite. The principal effect was make all awards go up, in the sense that the jury’s 
dollar award typically exceeded the median award of individual jurors.247 
Indeed, the effect was so pronounced that in 27% of cases, the jury’s verdict was 
as high as, or higher than, the highest predeliberation judgment of jurors!248 
There is a further point. The effect of deliberation, in increasing dollar awards, 
was most pronounced in the case of high awards. For example, the median 
individual judgment, in the case involving the defective yacht, was $450,000, 
whereas the median jury judgment, in that same case, was $1,000,000.249 But 
awards shifted upwards for low awards as well.250  
 
Why did this happen? A possible explanation, consistent with group 
polarization, is that any positive median award suggests a predeliberation 
tendency to punish, and deliberation aggravates that tendency by increasing 
awards. But even if it is right, this explanation seems insufficiently specific. The 
striking fact is that those arguing for higher awards seem to have an automatic 
rhetorical advantage over those arguing for lower awards. A subsequent study of 
law students supports this finding, suggesting that given existing social norms, 
people find it easy, in the abstract, to defend higher punitive awards against 
corporations, and harder to defend lower awards.251 Findings of rhetorical 
advantage have been made in seemingly distant areas. Suppose that doctors are 
deciding what steps to take to resuscitate patients. Are individuals less likely to 
support heroic efforts than groups? Evidence suggests that as individuals, 
doctors are less likely to do so than groups, apparently because those who favor 
such efforts have a rhetorical advantage over those who do not.252  
 
Or consider the difference between individual behavior and team 
behavior in the Dictator Game, used by social scientists to study selfishness and 
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 altruism.253 In this game, a subject is told that she can allocate a sum of money, 
say $10, between herself and some stranger. The standard economic prediction is 
that most subjects will keep all or almost all of the money for themselves; why 
should we share money with strangers? But the standard prediction is wrong. 
Most people choose to keep somewhere between $6 and $8 and to share the 
rest.254 The question here, however, is how is individual behavior is affected once 
people are placed in teams. The answer is that team members choose still more 
equal divisions.255 This result seems best explained by reference to a rhetorical 
advantage, disfavoring selfishness, even within a group that stands to benefit.256 
Apparently people do not want to appear to be greedy. Of course this outcome, 
and the effect of group influence, would change if the team in the Dictator Game 
had some reason to be hostile to the beneficiaries of their generosity. We can 
easily imagine a variation of the dictator game in which, for example, people of a 
relatively poor religious group were deciding how much to allocate to another 
religious group that was thought to be both hostile and far wealthier. In this 
variation, the rhetorical advantage might favor greater selfishness. 
 
But what produces a rhetorical advantage? The simplest answer points to 
prevailing social norms, which of course vary across time and place. Among 
most Americans, current norms make it easier to argue, other things equal, for 
higher penalties against corporations for egregious misconduct, But it is possible 
to imagine subcommunities (corporate headquarters?) in which the rhetorical 
advantage runs the other way. In any case it is easy to envisage many other 
contexts in which one or another side has an automatic rhetorical advantage. 
Consider, as possible examples, debates over whether there should be higher 
penalties for those convicted of drug offenses, or whether tax rates should be 
reduced; in modern political debates, those favoring higher penalties and lower 
taxes have the upper hand. Of course there are limits on the feasible level of 
change. But when a rhetorical advantage is involved, group deliberation will 
produce significant shifts in individual judgments. Undoubtedly legislative 
behavior is affected by mechanisms of this sort, and it is likely that many 
movements within judicial panels can be explained in similar terms.  
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 Are rhetorical advantages unhelpful or damaging? In the abstract, this is 
an impossible question to answer, because shifts have to be evaluated on their 
merits.257 Perhaps the higher punitive awards that follow deliberation are simply 
better. So too, perhaps, for the movements by doctors, taking more heroic 
measures, and by groups deciding how equally to spread funds. The only point 
is that such advantages exist; and it would be most surprising if they were 
always benign. 
 
F. More Extremism, Less Extremism 
 
Group polarization is not a social constant. It can be increased or 
decreased, and even eliminated, by certain features of group members or their 
situation.  
 
1. Antecedent extremism. Extremists are especially prone to polarization. 
It is more probable that they will shift and it is probable that they will shift more. 
When they start out an extreme point and are placed in a group of like-minded 
people, they are likely to go especially far in the direction with which they 
started.258 There is a lesson here about the sources of terrorism and political 
violence in general.259 And because there is a link between confidence and 
extremism, the confidence of particular members also plays an important role; 
confident people are more prone to polarization.260  
 
2. Solidarity and affective ties. If members of the group think that they 
have a shared identity, and a high degree of solidarity, there will be heightened 
polarization.261 One reason is that if people feel united by some factor (for 
example, politics or religious convictions), dissent will be dampened. If 
individual members tend to perceive one another as friendly, likable, and similar 
to them, the size and likelihood of the shift will increase.262 The existence of 
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 affective ties reduces the number of diverse arguments and also intensifies social 
influences on choice.263 One implication, noted above, is that mistakes are likely 
to be increased when group members are united mostly through bonds of 
affection and not through concentration on a particular task; it is in the former 
case that alternative views will less likely find expression.264 Hence people are 
less likely to shift if the direction advocated is being pushed by unfriendly group 
members.265 A sense of “group belongingness” affects the extent of 
polarization.266 In the same vein, physical spacing tends to reduce polarization; a 
sense of common fate and intragroup similarity tend to increase it, as does the 
introduction of a rival “outgroup.”267 
 
An interesting experiment attempted to investigate the effects of group 
identification.268 Some subjects were given instructions in which group 
membership was made salient (the “group immersion” condition), whereas 
others were not (the “individual” condition). For example, subjects in the group 
immersion condition were told that their group consisted solely of first-year 
psychology students, and that they were being tested as group members rather 
than as individuals. The relevant issues involved affirmative action, government 
subsidies for the theatre, privatization of nationalized industries, and phasing 
out nuclear power plants .The results were quite striking.269 Polarization 
generally occurred. But there was the least polarization in the individual 
condition; polarization was greater in the group immersion condition, when 
group identity was emphasized. This experiment strongly suggests that 
polarization is highly likely to occur, and to be most extreme, when group 
membership is made salient.  
 
3. Exit. Over time, group polarization can be fortified because of “exit,” as 
members leave the group because they reject the direction in which things are 
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 heading.270 If exit is pervasive, the tendency to extremism will be greatly 
aggravated. The group will end up smaller, but its members will be both more 
like-minded and more willing to take extreme measures; and that very fact will 
mean that internal discussions will produce more extremism still. If only loyalists 
stay, the group’s median member will be more extreme, and deliberation will 
produce increasingly extreme movements.  
 
4. Informed members and facts. When one or more people in a group 
know the right answer to a factual question, the group is likely to shift in the 
direction of accuracy.271 If the question is how many people were on the earth in 
1940, or the number of home runs hit by Hank Aaron, or the distance between 
Chicago and New York, and if one or a few people know the right answer, the 
group is likely not to polarize, but to converge on that answer. The reason is 
simple: The person who knows the answer will speak with confidence and 
authority, and is likely to be convincing for that very reason. Of course this is not 
inevitable; Asch’s conformity experiments show that social pressures can lead to 
errors even with respect to simple factual claims. But in many cases, group 
members who are ignorant will be tentative, and members who are informed 
will speak confidently. This is enough to ensure convergence on truth rather than 
polarization. Here there is a link between what prevents polarization and what 
shatters cascades: A person who knows, and is known to know, the truth. 
 
In this light it becomes easier to understand the outcomes of experiments 
that show a potential advantage of groups over individuals.272 One set of 
experiments involved two analytic tasks. The first involved a statistical problem, 
requiring subjects to guess the composition of an urn containing blue balls and 
red balls. (This experiment involved team decision-making and was not a test for 
cascade effects.) The other involved a problem in monetary policy, asking 
participants to manipulate the interest rate to steer the economy. People were 
asked to perform as individuals and in groups. The basic results for the two 
experiments were similar. Groups significantly outperformed individuals (and 
they did not, on balance, take longer to make decision). Perhaps most 
surprisingly, there were no differences between group decisions made with a 
unanimity requirement and group decisions made by majority rule. How can 
these results be explained? The experimenters do not have a complete account. 
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 An obvious possibility is that each group contained one or more strong analysts, 
who are able to move the group in the right direction. But a series of regressions, 
comparing the performance of the best individual players offers only mixed 
support for this hypothesis.273 It seems that in these experiments, group results 
were driven by the best points and arguments, which would be spread among 
the various individual players. Here we find a tribute to Aristotle’s suggestion 
that groups can do much better than individuals.274  
 
5. Equally opposed subgroups. Depolarization, rather than polarization, 
will be found when the relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally 
from two extremes.275 Thus if people who initially favor caution are put together 
with people who initially favor risk-taking, the group judgment will move 
toward the middle. Consider a study276 consisting of six-member groups 
specifically designed to contain two subgroups (of three persons each) initially 
committed to opposed extremes; the effect of discussion was to produce 
movement toward the center. One reason may be the existence of partially 
shared persuasive arguments in both directions.277 Interestingly, this study of 
equally opposed subgroups found the greatest depolarization with obscure 
matters of fact (e.g., the population of the United States in 1900)—and the least 
depolarization with highly visible public questions (e.g., whether capital 
punishment is justified). Matters of personal taste depolarized a moderate 
amount (e.g., preference for basketball or football, or for colors for painting a 
room).278 Hence “familiar and long-debated issues do not depolarize easily.”279 
With respect to such issues, people are simply less likely to shift at all, in part 
“because the total pool of arguments has long been familiar to all,”280 and 
nothing new will emerge from discussion.  
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 Compare in this regard an experiment designed to see how group 
polarization might be dampened.281 The experiment involved the creation of 
four-person groups, which, on the basis of pretesting, were known to include 
equal numbers of persons on two sides of political issues (whether smoking 
should be banned in public places, whether sex discrimination is a thing of the 
past, whether censorship of material for adults infringes on human liberties). 
Judgments were registered on a scale running from +4 (strong agreement) to 0 
(neutral) to –4 (strong disagreement). In half of the cases (the “uncategorized 
condition”), subjects were not made aware that the group consisted of equally 
divided subgroups in pretests. In the other half (the “categorized condition”), 
subjects were told that they would find a sharp division in their group, which 
consisted of equally divided subgroups. They were also informed who was in 
which group and told that they should sit around the table so that one subgroup 
was on one side facing the other group. In the uncategorized condition, 
discussion generally led to a dramatic reduction in the mean gap between the 
two sides, thus producing a convergence of opinion toward the middle of the 
two opposing positions (a mean of 3.40 scale points, on the scale of +4 to –4). But 
things were very different in the categorized condition. Here the shift toward the 
median was much less pronounced, and frequently there was barely any shift at 
all (a mean of 1.68 scale points). In short, calling attention to group membership 
made people far less likely to shift in directions urged by people from different 
groups. 
 
**         **        **         **         **        **     ** 
 
My discussion of group influences—of conformity, cascades, and 
polarization—is now complete. I have emphasized many findings from social 
science, but I have tried at the same time to give a sense of how those findings 
bear on issues in law and politics. It should be clear that there is a long list of 
potential applications, and any set of selections, from that list, is inevitably 
arbitrary. In the discussion that follows, I emphasize four areas in which an 
understanding of group influences helps to illuminate legal problems. The first 
involves law’s expressive function—the circumstances in which a mere 
statement, made by the law, is likely to affect people’s behavior. I draw a link 
among legal pronouncements, Milgram’s experimenter, and Asch’s unanimous 
confederates. The second involves the institutions of the American Constitution, 
based on the founding enthusiasm for the expression of diverse and dissenting 
                                                 
281 Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who You Are, 29 British J Soc. 
Psych. 97, 112 (1990) 
65 
 views. I suggest that the American Constitution creates a deliberative democracy 
of a distinctive kind—a deliberative democracy that prizes heterogeneity. The 
third area involves the value of dissent in a place not always thought to benefit 
from it: the federal judiciary. Because judges are subject to conformity and 
cascade effects as well as group polarization, it is exceedingly important to 
promote ideological diversity within the federal courts. The fourth and final area 
involves affirmative action in higher education. Here I offer an ambivalent 
lesson, suggesting that racial diversity is, in some domains, unimportant for the 
exchange of (relevant) ideas, but that it is important in other domains, usually 
involved in both undergraduate and law school education.  
 
V. The Expressive Function of Law 
 
In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion of law’s 
expressive function—of the role of law in “making statements,” as opposed to 
regulating conduct directly through actual punishments for violations.282 In this 
Part, I make three suggestions. First, we can better understand the expressive 
function of law if we see certain legal enactments as offering signals about what 
it is right to do and about what other people think it is right to do. Second, a legal 
expression is most likely to be effective if violations are highly visible; visibility 
matters because people do not want to incur the wrath of others . Third, a legal 
expression is most likely to be ineffective if violators are part of a deviant 
subcommunity which rewards, or at least does not punish, noncompliance. In 
such cases, behavior within the subcommunity can counteract the effects of law. 
Each of these points can be closely connected with an understanding of 
conformity, cascades, and group polarization. We can thus use that 
understanding to see when government might bring about compliance without 
relying on public enforcement—and also when enforcement is likely to be 
indispensable. 
  
A. Law As Signal 
 
 Sometimes law is infrequently enforced, but there is automatic or near-
automatic compliance.283 It is in this sense that law seems to have an expressive 
function, making statements and having effects merely by virtue of those 
statements. When effects occur, it is because the law offers signals on both the 
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 informational and reputational sides. If law is made by sensible people, and if 
law bans certain conduct, there is a good reason to presume that the conduct 
should be banned. And when law bans certain conduct, there is good reason to 
presume that other people think that the conduct should be banned. In either 
case, sensible people have fresh reason to do what the law asks them to do. Of 
course the presumptions can be rebutted. Informed people might know that the 
law is asking people to do something senseless, or not to do something sensible. 
They might also know that most people, or most relevant people, actually reject 
the law. But if these cases are the exception rather than the rule, we can have a 
better understanding of why law will produce movement even if no one is 
enforcing it. 
 
 Consider, for example, an empirical study of bans on smoking in public 
places.284 The simplest lesson is that people comply with those bans even though 
they are hardly ever enforced. The study finds that in three cities in California—
Berkeley, Richmond, and Oakland—there were very few complaints about 
violations. In Berkeley, the responsible health department officials found it 
unnecessary to issue even a single formal citation, and no cases were referred for 
prosecution.285 In restaurants in Richmond, compliance was nearly 100%, with 
workplace compliance hovering between 75%–85%.286 The level of compliance 
was also extremely high in Oakland, with the exception of “certain restaurants in 
the Asian community where nearly all the patrons are smokers.”287 High levels of 
compliance were also found in workplaces, high schools, and fast-food 
restaurants.288 Other studies, involving as Cambridge and Winnipeg, Manitoba, 
similarly find that bans on public smoking are almost entirely self-enforcing.289 
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 This evidence suggests that a legal pronouncement can have the same 
effect as Asch’s unanimous confederates. When a law bans smoking in public 
places, the pronouncement carries information to the effect that it is wrong, all 
things considered, to smoke in public places. Equally important, the law suggests 
that most people believe that it is wrong to smoke in public places. And if most 
people think that it is wrong to smoke in public places, would-be smokers are 
less likely to smoke, in part because they do not want to be criticized or 
reprimanded. It follows that when law is effective when unenforced, an 
important reason is the possibility of private enforcement. If violations have a 
high degree of visibility, and risk the wrath of private enforcers, compliance 
might well become widespread. “In contrast to violations of laws against driving 
and drinking, narcotics use, and tax evasion, infractions of no-smoking rules in 
public places are relatively visible . . . to an almost omnipresent army of self-
interested, highly motivated private enforcement agents—nonsmokers who 
resist exposure to tobacco smoke.”290 In some cases, the law might even be 
equivalent to Milgram’s experimenter, with a significant degree of authority 
even if no sanctions will be imposed. To the extent that the experimenter’s 
authority comes from a perception of expertise, the law is closely analogous.  
 
We might think of the underlying laws as exercises in norm 
management—and extremely inexpensive ones at that. They are inexpensive in 
the sense that taxpayer resources are unnecessary to produce compliance. And in 
the best cases, expressive law might even start, shatter, or fuel a cascade. Once 
compliance begins, and is widely seen as such (especially from “fashion 
leaders”), there might well be compliance cascades, spurred by both 
informational and reputational influences. In the context of sexual harassment 
and smoking, law does seem to have caught a wave—and to have enlarged it 
significantly.291 A key point here is that the law was ahead, but not too far ahead, 
of the public at large. If the law were not ahead of the public, it would add 
nothing, and in that sense have no effect at all. But if the law moved too far 
ahead of the public, it could not be effective without aggressive enforcement 
activity.292 And a law that is too far ahead of the public is unlikely, for that very 
reason, to be aggressively enforced: Prosecutors and jurors are unlikely to punish 
people when the public does not support punishment.293 Law is most effective 
when it goes somewhat, but not too far, beyond people’s existing values. 
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Thus far I have emphasized the situation from the point of view of the 
would-be violator. But a law has effects on private enforcers as well. In the 
absence of a legal ban, people who object to smoking in public places might well 
be timid about complaining, even if they find cigarette smoke irritating or worse. 
The same people are likely to be energized by a supportive enactment, which 
suggests both that they are right and that their beliefs are generally shared. With 
law on their side, they are less likely to appear to be noisy intermeddlers 
invoking a parochial norm. Someone who complains about speeding, or drunk 
driving, or smoking in public is far more likely to feel, or to be perceived as, 
having a legitimate complaint if the law requires the behavior they seek. Now of 
course this is not all of the picture. Among some people, the law has a high 
degree of moral authority, greatly exceeding the shared but unenacted view of 
many people.294 If this is the case, the law’s authority will extend well beyond 
that of Asch’s unanimous confederates, and probably beyond that of Milgram’s 
experimenter as well. But we cannot fully appreciate law’s moral authority 
without seeing it as intertwined with the informational and reputational factors 
that I have been emphasizing.  
 
B. The Preconditions of Norm Management 
 
 When will norm management work without significant enforcement 
activity? When will it fail? Begin with the case of a rational person who is 
considering whether to comply with the law. Among the relevant considerations 
are a) the likelihood of enforcement, b) the magnitude of the punishment in the 
event of enforcement, c) the reputational costs of violation, d) the reputational 
benefits of violation, e) the intrinsic benefits of compliance (perhaps a refusal to 
smoke will have health benefits), and f) the intrinsic costs of compliance (perhaps 
it is extremely pleasant to smoke, and extremely unpleasant not to smoke). By 
varying any of these variables, government might be able to achieve greater 
compliance. For present purposes, my emphasis is on c) and d). 
To know whether a legal pronouncement will be effective, a key point 
involves the nature and extent of private enforcement. Recall that in the Asch 
experiments, the level of error is significantly decreased when people’s answers 
are given anonymously, and also when people are given a financial incentive to 
answer correctly. These findings suggest that seemingly modest changes in social 
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 context can counteract the pressure to conform. Consider in this light the close 
empirical association between visibility and compliance without enforcement. 
Parking in places reserved for the handicapped, and smoking in public, are easy 
to see and in both cases private enforcement is likely.295 By contrast, tax 
violations and sex offenses tend to be invisible, and hence violators need not 
worry so much, at the time of violation, about the risk of public opprobrium.  
  
 At the same time, law’s expressive function can be reduced or even 
counteracted if there is private support for violations. “People will defy 
dominant norms or laws, despite considerable risks of punishment, when they 
enjoy the social support of a ‘deviant subculture’ that continues to endorse the 
validity of condemned behavior.”296 In such cases, prospective violators are 
roughly in the position of peer-supported subjects in the Milgram experiment—
at least if they have strong reason, based on principle or self-interest, not to 
comply. And if the law is perceived as senseless, private support for violations 
can operate in the same way as a voice of reason in the Asch experiments. Hence 
it is possible to find “deviant subcultures” in which violations of law are 
effectively rewarded, through admiration and even a general increase in statute. 
It is also possible to find subcultures in which those who comply with the law 
can be heavily “taxed,” through ridicule, ostracism, or even violence. Drug use in 
the most obvious example; gang violence sometimes occurs simply because it is 
expected and rewarded by peers. Laws that are infrequently enforced will, in 
such communities, be highly ineffective, because private enforcement is lacking, 
and indeed private forces push hard against compliance. It is even possible to 
imagine noncompliance cascades; such cascades can involve information, as 
people see the violations of others, perhaps including dissident “fashion 
leaders.” They can also involve reputation, as people learn that in the relevant 
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 community, there will be no loss in the good opinion of others, and possibly 
some gain, for violations. 
 
In this light it is easy to see why there is a great deal of compliance with 
legal bans on parking in handicapped spaces and on smoking in public places, 
whereas there is far less compliance with legal bans on certain sexual behavior 
and (in certain domains) the Internal Revenue Code.297 And it is also possible to 
understand the phenomenon of civil disobedience. When those engaged in civil 
disobedience are able to reach a critical mass, the law loses its authority, both as 
evidence of what should be done and as evidence of what (reasonable) people 
think should be done. The authority of the law is overcome by the authority of 
those engaged in disobeying the law. Here conformity pressures, cascade effects, 
and group polarization strongly favor disobedience. 
 
How might government handle the troublesome situations in which 
violations are both invisible and widespread? One possible remedy would be to 
let people know (if it is true) of the high current levels of voluntary compliance. 
Because people like to do what others do, large effects can come from reminders 
that most people obey the law or avoid harmful conduct. In fact there is evidence 
that taxpayers are far more likely to comply with the tax law if they believe that 
most people pay their taxes voluntarily, and far less likely to do so if they believe 
that noncompliance is widespread.298 A similar example may be drawn from 
college campuses. Students with a penchant for “binge drinking” tend to believe 
that the number of binge drinkers is higher than it is in fact. When informed of 
the actual numbers, they are less likely to persist in their behavior.299 These 
examples suggest that an understanding of group influences, and of the 
information conveyed by the acts of others, might be enlisted in efforts to reduce 
conduct that is unlawful or otherwise dangerous to self and others.  
 
VI.   Institutions and Diversity 
 
 I now turn to issues of institutional design. As we have seen, the likelihood 
and consequences of conformity, cascades, and group polarization very much 
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 depend on institutional choices. Recall in particular that people are far more 
likely to reveal their own information if they are rewarded for a correct group 
decision rather than for a correct individual decision. In this Part, I begin with a 
brief note on the relationship between dissent and war, with the suggestion that 
conformity, and suppression of dissent, can undermine military preparedness. I 
also explore some of the institutions of the American Constitution, suggesting 
that the founders’ largest theoretical contribution consisted in their enthusiasm 
for diversity and the “jarring” of diverse views in government. Turning to 
contemporary issues, I discuss the role of group influences on federal judges and 
the dispute over “diversity” as a justification for affirmative action in higher 
education. 
 
A. Dissent and War 
 
I have suggested that an understanding of social influences increases 
appreciation of the social role of whistleblowers and dissenters, many of whom 
sacrifice their own self-interest and simultaneously benefit the public. Perhaps 
the most general point here involves the role of diversity and dissent within 
democratic institutions. Consider the account of Luther Gulick, a high-level 
official in the Roosevelt Administration during World War II. In 1948, shortly 
after the Allied victory, Gulick delivered a series of lectures, unimaginatively 
titled Administrative Reflections from World War II, which offered, in some 
detail, a set of observations about bureaucratic structure and administrative 
reform.300 In a brief epilogue, Gulick set out to compare the warmaking capacities 
of democracies with those of their Fascist adversaries. 
 
Gulick began by noting that the initial evaluation of the United States, 
among the leaders of Germany and Japan, was “not flattering.”301 We were, in 
their view, “incapable of quick or effective national action even in our own 
defense because under democracy we were divided by our polyglot society and 
under capitalism deadlocked by our conflicting private interests.”302 Our 
adversaries said that we could not fight, and they believed what they said. And 
dictatorships did seem to have real advantages. They were free of delays, inertia, 
and sharp internal divisions. They did not have to reckon with the opinions of a 
mass of citizens, some with little education and little intelligence. Dictatorships 
could also rely on a single leader and an integrated hierarchy, making it easier to 
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 develop national unity and enthusiasm, to master surprise, and to act vigorously 
and with dispatch. But these claims, about the advantages of totalitarian regimes, 
turned out to be “bogus.”303  
 
The United States and its allies performed far better than Germany, Italy, 
and Japan. Gulick linked their superiority directly to democracy itself, and in 
particular “to the kind of review and criticism which democracy alone 
affords.”304 In a totalitarian regime, plans “are hatched in secret by a small group 
of partially informed men and then enforced through dictatorial authority.”305 
Such plans are likely to contain fatal weaknesses. By contrast, a democracy 
allows wide criticism and debate, thus avoiding “many a disaster.” In a 
totalitarian system, criticisms and suggestions are neither wanted nor heeded. 
“Even the leaders tend to believe their own propaganda. All of the stream of 
authority and information is from the top down,” so that when change is needed, 
the high command never learns of that need. But in a democracy, “the public and 
the press have no hesitation in observing and criticizing the first evidence of 
failure once a program has been put into operation.”306 In a democracy, 
information flows within the government—between the lowest and highest 
ranks—and via public opinion. Of course dissent can be muted in wartime, and 
for reasons I have discussed, this muting is a mixed blessing. If everyone seems 
to be on the same page, morale may be strengthened; but if disagreement is 
reduced, beneficial ideas—involving the nature, scope, justice, and wisdom of 
war—may be absent. 
 
With a combination of melancholy and surprise, Gulick noted that the 
United States and its allies did not show more unity than Germany, Japan, and 
Italy. “The gregarious social impulses of men around the world are apparently 
much the same, giving rise to the same reactions of group loyalty when men are 
subjected to the same true or imagined group threats.”307 Top-down management 
of mass morale, by the German and Japanese leaders, actually worked. 
Dictatorships were less successful in war, not because of less loyalty or more 
distrust from the public, but because leaders did not receive the checks and 
corrections that come from democratic processes. 
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 Gulick is offering a claim here about how institutions perform better when 
challenges are frequent, when people do not stifle themselves, and when 
information flows freely.308 Of course Gulick is providing his personal account of 
a particular set of events, and we do not really know if success in war is a 
product of democratic institutions.309 The Soviet Union, for example, fought 
valiantly and well, even under the tyranny of Stalin. But Gulick’s general theme 
contains a great deal of truth. Institutions are far more likely to succeed if they 
contain mechanisms that subject leaders to critical scrutiny and if they ensure 
that courses of action will be subject to continuing monitoring and review from 
outsiders310—if, in short, they use diversity and dissent to reduce the risks of 
error that come from social influences. 
 
B. Constitutional Design 
 
These points very much bears on the design of the American Constitution, 
which attempts to create a deliberative democracy, that is, a system that 
combines accountability to the people with a measure of reflection and reason-
giving. 311 In recent years, many people have discussed the aspiration to 
deliberative democracy. Their goal has been to show that a well-functioning 
system attempts to ensure not merely electoral responsiveness, but also an 
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 exchange of reasons in the public sphere.312 In a deliberative democracy, the 
exercise of public power must be justified by reasons, not merely by the will of 
some segment of society, and indeed not merely by the will of the majority. Both 
the opponents and the advocates of the Constitution were firmly committed to 
political deliberation. They also considered themselves “republicans,” committed 
to a high degree of self-government.313 But deliberative democracies can come in 
many different forms, The framers’ greatest innovation consisted not in their 
belief in deliberation, which uncontested at the time, but in their fear of 
homogeneity, their enthusiasm for diversity, and their effort to accommodate 
and to structure that diversity. In the founding period, a large part of the nation’s 
discussion turned on the possibility of having that form of government in a 
nation with its heterogeneous citizenry.  
 
The antifederalists, opponents of the proposed Constitution, thought that 
this was impossible. Thus Brutus, an especially articulate advocate of the 
antifederalist view, spoke for the classical tradition when he urged: “In a 
republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. 
If this be not the case, there will be constant clashing of opinions; and the 
representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the 
other.”314 The advocates of the Constitution believed that Brutus had it exactly 
backwards. They welcomed the diversity and the “constantly clashing of 
opinions” and affirmatively sought a situation in which “the representatives of 
one part will be continually striving against those of the other.” Alexander 
Hamilton spoke most clearly on the point, urging that the” differences of 
opinion, and the jarring of parties in [the legislative] department of the 
government . . . often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to 
check the excesses of the majority.”315 From the standpoint of political 
                                                 
312 See, e.g, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (1999). 
313 See Bessette, supra note. 
314 2 The Complete Antifederalist 269 (H. Storing ed. 1980). 
315 The Federalist No. 70, at 426-37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). Compare 
Asch’s claim: “The clash of views generates events of far-reaching importance. I am induced to 
take up a particular standpoint, to view my own action as another views it . . . Now I have within 
me two standpoints, my own and that of the other; both are now part of my way of thinking. In 
this way the limitations of my individual thinking are transcended by including the thoughts of 
others. I am now open to more alternatives than my own unaided comprehension would make 
possible. Disagreements, when their causes are intelligible, can enrich and strengthen, rather than 
injure, our sense of objectivity.” Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 131-32 (1952). From a quite 
different discipline, John Rawls writes in similar terms: “In everyday life the exchange of opinion 
with others checks our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things form the 
standpoint of others and the limits of our vision are brought home to us. . . . The benefits from 
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 deliberation, the central problem is that widespread error and social 
fragmentation are likely to result when like-minded people, insulated from 
others, move in extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools 
and parochial influences. A Constitution that ensures the “jarring of parties” and 
“differences of opinion” will provide safeguards against unjustified movements 
of view. 
 
A similar point emerges from one of the most illuminating early debates, 
raising the question whether the bill of rights should include a “right to instruct” 
representatives. That right was defended with the claim that citizens of a 
particular region ought to have the authority to bind their representatives about 
how to vote. This defense might seem plausible as a way of improving the 
political accountability of representatives—and so it seemed to many at the time. 
But there is a problem with this view, especially in an era in which political 
interest was closely aligned with geography. In such an era, it is likely that the 
citizens of a particular region, influenced by one another’s views, might end up 
with indefensible positions, very possibly as a result of its own insularity, 
leading to cascade effects and group polarization. In rejecting the right to 
instruct, Roger Sherman gave the decisive argument:  
 
“[T]he words are calculated to mislead the people, by conveying an idea 
that they have a right to control the debates of the Legislature. This cannot be 
admitted to be just, because it would destroy the object of their meeting. I think, 
when the people have chosen a representative, it is his duty to meet others from 
the different parts of the Union, and consult, and agree with them on such acts as 
are for the general benefit of the whole community. If they were to be guided by 
instructions, there would be no use in deliberation.”316 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators are limited in knowledge and the 
ability to reason. No one of them knows everything the others know, or can make all the same 
inferences that they can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and 
enlarging the range of arguments.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 358-59 (1971). The idea can be 
traced to Aristotle, suggesting that when diverse groups “all come together . . . they may surpass 
– collectively and as a body, although not individually – the quality of the few best. . . . When 
there are many who contribute to the process of deliberation, each can bring his share of 
goodness and moral prudence; . . . some appreciate one part, some another, and all together 
appreciate all.” Aristotle, Politics 123 (E. Barker trans. 1972). Much of my discussion here has 
been devoted to showing why and under what circumstances this view might or might not be 
true. 
316 1 Annals of Cong. 733-45 (Joseph Gale ed. 1789). 
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 Sherman’s words reflect the founders’ general receptivity to deliberation 
among people who are quite diverse and who disagree on issues both large and 
small. Indeed, it was through deliberation among such persons that “such acts as 
are for the general benefit of the whole community” would emerge. 
 
Most important, the institutions of the Constitution reflect a fear of group 
influences, cascade effects, and polarization, creating a range of checks on ill-
considered judgments that emerge from those processes. The most obvious 
example is bicameralism, designed as a safeguard against a situation in which 
one house—in the framers’ view, most likely the House of Representatives—
would be overcome by short-term passions and even group polarization. This 
was the point made by Hamilton in endorsing a “jarring of parties” within the 
legislature. James Wilson's great lectures on law spoke of bicameralism very 
much in these terms, referring to "instances, in which the people have become 
the miserable victims of passions, operating on their government without 
restraint," and seeing a "single legislature" as prone to "sudden and violent fits of 
despotism, injustice, and cruelty."317 To be sure, a cascade can cross the 
boundaries that separate the Senate from the House; such crossings do occur. But 
their different compositions and cultures provide a significant safeguard against 
warrantless cascades. Here the Senate was thought to be especially important. 
Consider the widely reported story that on his return from France, Jefferson 
called Washington to account at the breakfast-table for having agreed to a second 
chamber. "Why, asked Washington, "did you pour that coffee into your saucer?" 
"To cool it," quoth Jefferson. "Even so," said Washington, "we pour legislation 
into the senatorial saucer to cool it."318 
 
We can understand many aspects of the system of checks and balances in 
the same general terms. The duty to present legislation to the President protects 
against cascade effects within the legislative branch.319 Because law cannot 
operate against citizens without the concurrence of the legislative and executive 
                                                 
317 James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 1 The Works of James Wilson 291 (Robert Green McCloskey 
ed., 1967). 
318 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) 359. 
319 See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 678 (1929) (contending that it is an "essential... part of 
the constitutional provisions, guarding against ill-considered and unwise legislation, that the 
President... should have the full time allowed him for determining whether he should approve or 
disapprove a bill, and if disapproved, for adequately formulating the objections that should be 
considered by Congress"); 1 The Works of James Wilson, supra note 290, at 432 (urging that the 
President's qualified veto will "secure an additional degree of accuracy and circumspection in 
thee manner of passing the laws"). 
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 branches, enacting and then enforcing the law, there is a further safeguard 
against oppression. Federalism itself was, and remains, an engine of diversity, 
creating “circuit breakers” in the form of a variety of sovereigns with separate 
cultures. In the federal system, social influences may produce error in some 
states, and states can certainly fall into cascades.320 But the existence of separate 
systems creates some check on the diffusion of error.321  
 
Judicial power itself was understood in related terms, quite outside of the 
context of constitutional review; consider Hamilton’s account322: 
 
“But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the 
independence of judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of 
occasional ill humours in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to 
the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and 
partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistry is of vast importance 
in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only 
serves the moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been 
passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; 
who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are to be 
expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very 
motives of the injustice they mediate, to qualify their attempts.” 
 
Of course the Constitution’s explicit protection of freedom of speech, and 
its implicit protection of freedom of association,323 help to ensure spaces for 
diversity and dissent. In that way, they counteract some of the risks of mistake 
that stem from group influences. For present purposes, the analysis of free 
speech is straightforward, but it is worth emphasizing that freedom of expression 
diminishes the gap between a nation’s leaders and its citizens, and for that 
reason promotes monitoring of the former by the latter.324 James Madison, the 
author of the first amendment, used this point to object to the whole idea of a 
“Sedition Act,” criminalizing certain forms of criticism of public officials. 
Madison urged that “the right of electing the members of the Government 
constitutes . . . the essence of a free and responsible government,” and that the 
“value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative 
                                                 
320 See Kuran and Sunstein, supra note. 
321 See Michael McConnell, Evaluating the Founders’ Design, U. Chi. L. Rev.; Lynn Baker and 
Ernest Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke LJ 75 (1999). 
322 The Federalist No. 78, at 528 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
323 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 US 449 (1958). 
324 For a technical discussion, see Mui, supra note. 
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 merits and demerits of the candidates for the public trust.”325 If group influences 
are kept in mind, one implication is that government might in some settings have 
a legitimate interest in introducing diversity of opinion into domains that that 
otherwise consist of like-minded people. The reason is simply to diminish the 
risks of error. If modern technologies allow people to sort themselves into 
congenial communities, there is a risk that people will be insulated from 
competing views.326 Perhaps government should be entitled to respond. Of 
course any such efforts, on government’s part, will introduce first amendment 
problems of its own.327  
 
Freedom of association presents some important wrinkles. An 
understanding of group polarization suggests that associational freedom can 
produce significant risks, above all because like-minded people might, by the 
laws of social interactions, end up in unjustifiably extreme directions. Society 
might well become fragmented as a result of “iterated polarization games,” in 
which groups of like-minded people—initially different, but not terribly 
different, from one another—drive their members toward increasingly diverse 
positions. Small differences in initial views might well be magnified, through 
social interactions, into very large ones.328 An advantage of this process is that 
serves to increase society’s stock of “argument pools”; but it also increases the 
likelihood of mutual suspicion, misunderstanding, and even hatred. At the same 
time, freedom of association helps to counteract the informational and 
reputational influences that might well lead people to fail to disclose 
information, preferences, and values. By allowing a wide diversity of 
communities, imposing pressures of quite different kinds, freedom of association 
increases the likelihood that at some point, important information will be 
disclosed and eventually spread.329  
 
Nothing in this brief account means that the American Constitution, as 
originally ratified or as now understood, contains the ideal institutions and 
rights for balancing diversity with other goals, including stability. Some people, 
                                                 
325 James Madison, Report of 1800, January 7, 1800, in 17 Papers of JamesMaison (David Mattern 
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326 See Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com (2002), for general discussion. 
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 for example, argue on behalf of proportional representation,330 either of 
demographic groups or of a large number of parties, and it is possible to 
understand those arguments as responsive to the goal of guaranteeing a wide 
range of ideas in government. Efforts to ensure that disadvantaged groups are 
represented as such might be urged on this ground.331 In some nations, there 
have been serious attempts to ensure equal representation for women, in large 
part on the ground that without such representation, important points of view 
will be absent. There is much to be said about this large topic.332 But to anchor the 
discussion, I now turn to two more particular issues, both of considerable 
contemporary concern: diversity on the federal judiciary and affirmative action 
in higher education. 
 
C. Judges 
 
1. Data. Are judges subject to conformity effects? Are they likely to 
cascade? Do like-minded judges move to extremes? What is the effect of 
anticipated and actual dissents? For obvious reasons this is not an easy topic to 
investigate. But consider judicial behavior on the D.C. Circuit.333 A panel of three 
Republican judges is far more likely to strike down agency action, at the behest 
of industry, than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat. At the 
individual level, group influences are at least equally striking: When sitting with 
two Republicans, a Democratic judge is more likely to vote to strike down 
agency action than is a Republican when sitting with two Democrats. It does not 
much matter whether the judge of a single party is actually persuaded or instead 
decides that it is simply not worthwhile to dissent publicly. In either case, the 
vote reflects social influences, in a process that is not entirely different from what 
is observed in the Asch experiments.334 
 
                                                 
330 See Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (1995); Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference 183-91 (1994). 
331 See id; Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note. 
332 See note supra. 
333 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 
1717 (1997); Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine, 107 Yale LJ 2155 (1998). 
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 Several studies find a strong tendency toward more extreme results when 
a panel consists of judges from a single political party.335 The background fact is 
that when industry challenges an environmental regulation, there is an 
extraordinary difference between the behavior of a Republican majority and that 
of a Democratic majority. Republican majorities reverse agencies over 50% of the 
time; Democratic majorities do so less than 15% of the time.336 There are also 
significant findings of group influence. Judges’ votes are greatly affected by 
whether there is another judge, on that panel, appointed by a president from the 
same political party. A Republican judge is much more likely to accept an 
industry challenge if she has a Republican colleague on the panel. A Democratic 
judge is far less likely to accept such a challenge if she has a Democratic 
colleague on the panel.337 Hence a single Democratic judge, accompanied by two 
Republicans, votes in favor of industry challenges over 40% of the time; but 
when joined by one or more Democrats, the Democratic judge votes in favor of 
such challenges less than 30% of the time.338  
 
By contrast, a single Republican votes in favor of industry challenges less 
than 20% of the time.339 Remarkably, a single Republican, accompanied by two 
Democrats, is less likely to accept an industry challenge than a single Democrat, 
accompanied by two Republicans. This is a real testimony to the strength of 
group influences (and also judicial reluctance to dissent publicly, either because 
it can be difficult and time-consuming to produce a dissent or because dissenting 
can seem an antisocial act). It might seem reasonable to say that a Democrat, 
sitting with two Republicans, votes like a Republican, whereas a Republican, 
sitting with two Democrats, votes like a Democrat. This view is not entirely 
wrong, but it is misleading. The problem is that how a Democrat votes, and how 
a Republican votes, is very much a function of whether they are accompanied by 
one or two people from their own party, or none at all.340 For this reason, there is 
no single way, independent of group influences, that either a Republican or 
Democrat tends to vote—at least in the context of industry challenges to agency 
regulations. 
 
                                                 
335 See my own data, described below, and Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the DC 
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 In a testimonial to group polarization, a panel of three Republican judges 
is far more likely than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat to reverse 
an environmental decision when industry challenges that decision.341 In one 
period (1995 to 2002), 71% of Republican votes, on all-Republican panels, 
accepted industry challenges.342 By contrast, 45% of Republican votes, on two-to-
one Republican panels, accepted such challenges—and 37.5% of such votes did 
so on two-to-one Republican panels.343 In a earlier period (1986-1994), the 
corresponding numbers were 80%, 48%, and 14%.344 In a still earlier period (1970-
1982), 100% of Republicans votes, on all-Republican panels, were in favor of 
industry challenges. By contrast, only 45% of Republican votes, on two-to-one 
Republican panels, were in favor of industry challenges—and only 26% of 
Republican votes, on Democratic-dominated panels, were in favor of such 
challenges.345  
 
Aggregating this data, we can produce a broadly representative and 
nearly complete account of votes, within the D.C. Circuit, in environmental cases 
between 1979 and 2002. A simple calculation shows that in all-Republican panels, 
Republicans voted to accept industry challenges 80% of the time; that in two-to-
one Republican panels, Republicans voted to accept such challenges 48% of the 
time; and that in two-to-one Democratic panels, Republicans voted to accept 
industry challenges only 27.5 of the time. And group polarization is hardly 
limited to Republican judges; it occurs among Democratic judges as well. When 
an environmental group is challenging agency action, a panel of three Democrats 
is more likely to accept the challenge than a panel of two Democrats and one 
Republican.346 The likelihood that a Democrat will vote in favor of an 
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 environmentalist challenge is highest when three Democrats are on the panel—
and lowest when the panel has two Republicans.347  
 
A third study is more complicated.348 Under the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Chevron v. NRDC,349 courts are supposed to uphold agency interpretations of 
law so long as the interpretations are “reasonable.” But when do courts actually 
uphold such interpretations? The doctrine allows judges considerable room to 
maneuver, so that courts that are inclined to invalidate agency action usually can 
find a plausible basis for doing so. The real question is when they will claim to 
have found that plausible basis. The second study strongly suggests that group 
influences play a role and that the potential for a dissent, from a Democratic 
judge, is a strong deterrent to Republican judges who are inclined to invalidate 
agency action. As a background fact, note that the study finds an exceedingly 
strong influence, within the influential court of appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, of party affiliation on outcomes. If observers were to code 
cases very crudely, by taking account of whether industry or a public interest 
group is bringing the challenge, they would find that a majority of Republicans 
reach a conservative judgment 54% of the time, whereas a majority of Democrats 
reach such a judgment merely 32% of the time.350  
 
For present purposes, the most important finding is that there is a 
dramatic difference between politically diverse panels, with judges appointed by 
Presidents of more than one party, and politically unified panels, with judges 
appointed by Presidents of only one party. On divided panels in which a 
Republican majority of the court might be expected, on broadly speaking 
political grounds, to be hostile to the agency, the court nonetheless deferred to 
the agency 62% of the time. But on unified panels in which an all-Republican 
panel might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court upheld the 
agency’s interpretation only 33% of the time. Note that this was the only such 
finding in the data. When Democratic majority courts were expected to uphold 
the agency’s decision on political grounds, they did so over 70% of the time, 
whether unified (71% of the time) or divided (86% of the time). Consider the 
results in tabular form351: 
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  3–0  
Republican 
Panel 
2–1  
Republican 
Panel 
3–0  
Democratic 
Panel 
2–1  
Democratic 
Panel 
Uphold 
Agency 
Action 
33% 62% 71% 86% 
Invalidate 
Agency 
Action 
67% 38% 29% 14% 
 
It seems reasonable to speculate that the seemingly bizarre result—a 67% 
invalidation rate when Republican judges are unified—reflects group influences 
and in particular group polarization. A group of all-Republican judges might 
well take the relatively unusual step of rejecting an agency’s interpretation, 
whereas a divided panel, with a built-in check on any tendency toward the 
unusual or extreme outcome, is more likely to take the conventional route. A 
likely reason is that the single Democratic judge acts as a “whistleblower,” 
discouraging the other judges from making a decision that is in tension with the 
Supreme Court’s command to uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes.352 And other factors are involved. When a court consists of a panel of 
judges with the same basic orientation, the median view, before deliberation 
begins, will be significantly different from what it would be with a panel of 
diverse judges. The argument pool will be very different as well. For example, a 
panel of three Republican judges, tentatively inclined to invalidate the action of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will offer a range of arguments in 
support of invalidation and relatively few in the other direction—even if the law, 
properly interpreted, favors validation. If the panel contains a judge who is 
inclined to uphold the EPA, the arguments that favor validation are far more 
likely to emerge and to be pressed. Indeed, the very fact that the judge is a 
Democrat increases the likelihood that this will occur, since that judge might not 
think of himself as being part of the same “group” as the other panel members. 
(Recall that when people are connected by ties of solidarity, disagreement is all 
the less likely.) And because corroboration of opinion leads to greater confidence 
and hence extremity, it is not surprising that a panel of three like-minded judges 
would lead to unusual and extreme results. 
 
In this context, the effect is fortified by the possibility that the sole judge, 
finding himself outnumbered, might produce a dissenting opinion in public. To 
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 be sure, Supreme Court review is rare and in the general run of cases, the 
prospect of such review probably does not have much of a deterrent effect on 
courts of appeals. But judges who write majority opinions are usually not 
enthusiastic about having to see and to respond to dissenting opinions. And if 
the law actually favors the dissenting view, two judges, even if they would like 
to reverse the Environmental Protection Agency, might be influenced to adopt 
the easier course of validation. The evidence so suggests.353  
 
A glance at the table immediately above offers some countervailing data: 
A panel of three Democrats is not more likely than a panel with two Democrats 
to uphold agency action in cases in which Democrats might be expected to want 
to uphold the agency. And in the context of a challenge from an environmental 
group, a Republican judge is not likely to vote differently if he is accompanied by 
two Democrats, one Republican, or two Republicans.354 But in some important 
domains, at least, a panel of three like-minded judges will indeed behave 
differently from a panel with two. It would be most interesting to learn what 
pattern would be observed in other contexts. What does the evidence show if, in 
criminal cases, we compare panels of three Democratic judges with panels 
containing two Democrats and one Republican? Are the three Democrats far 
more inclined to reverse a criminal conviction than a panel with one Republican? 
In any case the basic claim here can generate hypotheses about a wide range of 
areas. We might hypothesize, for example, that all-Republican panels would not 
be enthusiastic about sex discrimination claims, and that all-Democratic panels 
show far more sympathy for such claims. Perhaps all-Democratic panels would 
be particularly skeptical about claims that government regulation amounts to an 
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. Perhaps 
all-Republican panels would show unusual enthusiasm for such claims. 
  
At this point a skeptic might note that lawyers make adversarial 
presentations before judges. Such a skeptic might insist that the size of the 
“argument pool” is determined by those presentations, not only and not even 
mostly by what members of the panel are inclined to say and to do. And 
undoubtedly the inclinations of judges are shaped, some of the time, by the 
contributions of advocates. But even if this is so, what matters, for purposes of 
the outcomes, is the inclinations of judges, whatever they are based on; and it is 
here that the existence of a single dissenter can make all the difference. In the 
punitive damage study discussed above, mock juries were presented with 
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 arguments from both sides, and polarization followed this presentation, as it has 
elsewhere.355 Notice in this regard that for polarization hypothesis to hold, it is 
not necessary to know whether judges spend a great deal of time offering 
reasons to one another. Mere exposure to a conclusion is enough.356 A system of 
simple votes, unaccompanied by reasons, should incline judges to polarize. Of 
course reasons, if they are good ones, are likely to make those votes especially 
persuasive. 
 
2. The normative issue. It remains to investigate the normative issues. If 
like-minded judges go to extremes, should we be troubled? Is it good if a large 
effect is found from a single judge from a different party? More generally: Is 
there reason to attempt to ensure diversity on the federal courts? To promote a 
degree of diversity on panels? There is a widespread view that judges appointed 
by presidents of different political parties are not fundamentally different and 
that once on the bench, judges frequently surprise those who nominated them.357 
The view is not entirely baseless, but it is misleading. Some appointees do 
disappoint the Presidents who nominated them, but the availability heuristic 
should not fool us into thinking that these examples are typical. Judges 
appointed by Republican presidents are quite different from judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents. “Partisanship clearly affects how appellate courts review 
agency discretion.”358  
 
But it seems difficult to evaluate the underlying issues without taking a 
stand on the merits—without knowing what we want judges to do. Suppose that 
three Republican judges are especially likely to uphold criminal convictions, and 
that three Democratic judges are especially likely to reverse those convictions. At 
first glance, one or the other is troubling only if we know whether we approve of 
one or another set of results. In the punitive damage study discussed above, the 
movement toward increased awards might be something to celebrate, not to 
deplore, if we conclude that the median of predeliberation awards is too low and 
that the increase, produced by group discussion, ensures more sensible awards. 
And if a view about what judges should do is the only possible basis for 
evaluation, we might conclude that those who prefer judges of a particular party 
should seek judges of that party, and that group influences are essentially beside 
the point. 
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But the conclusion is too strong. In some cases, the law, properly 
interpreted, really does argue strongly for one or another view. The existence of 
diversity on a panel is likely to bring that fact to light and perhaps to move the 
panel’s decision in the direction of what the law requires. The existence of 
politically diverse judges, and of a potential dissent, increases the probability 
that the law will be followed. The Chevron study, referred to above, strongly 
supports this point.359 The presence of a potential dissenter—in the form of a 
judge appointed by a president from another political party—creates a possible 
whistleblower who can reduce the likelihood of an incorrect or lawless 
decision.360 Through an appreciation of the nature of group influences, we can 
see the wisdom in an old idea: A decision is more likely to be right, and less 
likely to be political in a pejorative sense, if it is supported by judges with 
different predilections.  
 
There is a further point. Suppose that in many areas, it is not clear, in 
advance, whether the appointees of Democratic or Republican presidents are 
correct. Suppose that we are genuinely uncertain. If so, there is reason to favor a 
situation in which the legal system has both, simply on the ground that through 
that route, more (reasonable) opinions are likely to be heard. And if we are 
genuinely uncertain, there is reason to favor a mix of views merely by virtue of 
its moderating effect. In the face of uncertainty, sensible people choose between 
the poles.361  
 
3. An analogy. Consider an analogy. Modern law and policy is often made 
by independent regulatory commissions, such as the Federal Trade Commission, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, 
and the Federal Communications Commission. Much of the time, such agencies 
act through adjudication. They function in the same fashion as federal courts. 
And under federal statutes, Congress has attempted to ensure that these agencies 
are not monopolized by either Democrats or Republicans. The law requires that 
no more than a bare majority of agency members may be from a single party.362 
An understanding of group influences helps explain this requirement. An 
independent agency that is all-Democratic, or all-Republican, might move 
toward an extreme position, indeed a position that is more extreme than that of 
                                                 
359 See Cross and Tiller, supra note. 
360 This is the explanation in Cross and Tiller, supra note, at 2173. 
361 For evidence, see Mark Kelman et al., Context-Independence in Legal Decisionmaking, in 
Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000). 
362 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994). 
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 the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of any 
agency official standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership can 
operate as a check against movements of this kind. Congress was apparently 
aware of this general point. Closely attuned to the policymaking functions of the 
relevant institutions, it was careful to provide a safeguard against extreme 
movements.  
 
Why do we fail to create similar safeguards for courts? Part of the answer 
must lie in a belief that unlike heads of independent regulatory commissions, 
judges are not policymakers. Their duty is to follow the law, not to make policy. 
An attempt to ensure bipartisan composition would seem inconsistent with the 
commitment to this belief. But the evidence I have discussed shows judges are 
policymakers of an important kind, and that their political commitments very 
much influence their votes. In principle, there is good reason to attempt to ensure 
a mix of perspectives within courts of appeals. 
 
Of course the idea of diversity, or of a mix of perspectives, is hardly self-
defining. It would not be appropriate to say that the federal judges should 
include people who refuse to obey the Constitution, or who refuse to exercise the 
power of judicial review, or who think that the Constitution allows suppression 
of political dissent and racial segregation. Here as elsewhere, the domain of 
appropriate diversity is limited. What is necessary is reasonable diversity, or 
diversity of reasonable views, and not diversity as such. People can certainly 
disagree about what reasonable diversity entails in this context. All that I am 
suggesting here is that there is such a thing as reasonable diversity, and that it is 
important to ensure that judges, no less than anyone else, are exposed to it, and 
not merely through the arguments of advocates. 
 
4. The Senate’s role. These points cast fresh light on a much disputed 
issue: the legitimate role of the Senate in giving “advice and consent” to 
presidential appointments to the federal judiciary. Above all, an understanding 
of social influences suggests that the Senate has a responsibility to exercise its 
constitutional authority in order to ensure a reasonable diversity of view. The 
Constitution’s history fully contemplates an independent role for the Senate in 
the selection of Supreme Court Justices.363 That independent role certainly 
authorizes the Senate to consider the general approach, and likely pattern of 
votes, of potential judges. There can be no doubt that the President considers the 
                                                 
363 See David A. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation 
Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491 (1992). 
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 general approach of his nominees; the Senate is entitled to do so as well. Under 
good conditions, these simultaneous powers would bring about a healthy form 
of checks and balances, permitting each branch to counter the other. Indeed, that 
system is part and parcel of social deliberation about the direction of the federal 
judiciary.  
 
Why might this view be rejected? It could be urged that there is only one 
legitimate approach to constitutional or statutory interpretation—that, for 
example, some version of originalism or textualism is the only such approach, 
and that anyone who rejects that view is unreasonable. For true believers, it is 
pointless to argue for diverse views.364 Diversity is not necessary, or even 
valuable, if we already know what should be done, and if competing views 
would simply cloud the issue. (In a scientific dispute, it is not helpful to include 
those who believe that the earth is flat.) Or it might be urged that a deferential 
role for the Senate, combined with natural political competition and cycles, will 
produce a sensible mix over time. I do not deny this possibility. My only 
suggestions are that a high degree of diversity on the federal judiciary is 
desirable, that the Senate is entitled to pursue diversity, and that without such 
diversity, judicial panels are will inevitably go in unjustified directions. 
 
D. Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
 
Countless educational institutions pursue the goal of diversity. Most of 
America’s large private and public institutions seek a wide range of views, 
faculty, and students. There are some prominent exceptions; some institutions 
pride themselves on a high degree of homogeneity.365 And here as elsewhere, the 
idea of diversity needs to be clarified. Colleges and universities do not make 
special efforts to include students who collect Britney Spears memorabilia, hate 
America, smell bad, or have low SAT’s. Such institutions are committed to 
diversity, but only to a certain degree and of a certain kind. It remains possible to 
urge, as many do, that they give excessive attention to diversity of some kinds 
and insufficient attention to diversity of other kinds. The only point I am making 
here is that they tend to be committed to diversity of a recognizable sort.  
                                                 
364 Note, however, that even if it would be appropriate for all judges to share a certain approach, 
it is also desirable to have diversity with respect to the application of that approach. Textualists 
do not all agree with one another; there is internal diversity in the world of originalism. Diversity 
is appropriate here to ensure an airing of reasonable views. 
365 See the discussion of Brigham Young University in Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity 
(1999). 
89 
  
There are many reasons for this commitment. One involves simple market 
pressures; a school that has different sorts of students is more likely to be able to 
attract good faculty and good students.366 Of course people’s preferences and 
values vary, and some people want to go to places that are relatively 
homogeneous. But this seems to be the exception rather than the rule.367 And 
there is another justification for diversity, one that has received considerable 
attention within courts368 and that is closely related to my topic here. The idea is 
that education is simply likely to be better if the school has people with different 
views, perspectives, and experiences. In the context of affirmative action, this 
justification was approved in Justice Powell’s decisive opinion in the Bakke 
case,369 an opinion that has the unusual distinction of having settled, for a period 
of decades, the constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education without 
having been embraced by any other justice on the Supreme Court. My goal here 
is to offer a qualified defense of Justice Powell’s view. I urge that in some 
educational settings, racial diversity is important for ensuring a broad array of 
experiences and ideas, and that in those settings, narrowly tailored affirmative 
action programs should be constitutionally permissible. 
 
Justice Powell insisted that a diverse student body is a constitutionally 
acceptable goal for higher education.370 The central reason is that universities 
should be allowed to ensure a “robust exchange of ideas,” an interest connected 
with the first amendment itself.371 Justice Powell acknowledged that this interest 
seemed strongest in the context of undergraduate education, where views are 
formed on a large number of topics. But even in a medical school, “the 
contribution of diversity is substantial.”372 A medical student having a particular 
background, including a particular ethnic background, “may bring to a 
                                                 
366 Note that this justification is most unlikely to be legitimate as a constitutional matter. A public 
institution is not permitted to justify discrimination by claiming, or even showing, that many of 
its constituents call for it. Brown v. Bd. of Education itself requires that conclusion; see also 
Palmore v. Sadoti, 466 US 429, 441 (1984), suggesting that private “biases may be outside the 
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” 
367 Recall the prior qualifications about the definition of diversity. Even apparently diverse 
institutions are homogenous in certain ways and along certain dimensions, and this is what 
students and faculty seem to prefer. 
368 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th 
Cir. 2002). 
369 See 438 US 265 (1978 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
370 438 US at 311-12. 
371 Id. at 313. 
372 Id. 
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 professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the 
training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with 
understanding their vital service to humanity.”373 Justice Powell also emphasized 
that doctors “serve a heterogeneous population,” and suggested that graduate 
admissions decisions are concerned with contributions that follow formal 
education.374  
 
Thus Justice Powell concluded that the crucial question was whether a 
race-conscious admission program, giving benefits to people because they are 
members of racial minority groups, was a necessary means of promoting the 
legitimate goal of diversity. Here he reached his famous conclusion that racial or 
ethnic background could be a “plus” in the admissions decision, though quotas 
would not be allowed.375 For Justice Powell, a legitimate admissions program 
should be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light 
of the particular qualifications of the applicant, and to place them on the same 
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according to them the same 
weight.”376 Thus it would be acceptable to promote “beneficial educational 
pluralism” by considering a range of factors, including “demonstrated 
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with 
the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.”377 
 
  My central concern here is the principal378 basis for Justice Powell’s 
conclusion: the value of ensuring a “robust exchange of ideas” in the classroom, 
and the legitimacy of promoting racial diversity in order to ensure that 
exchange. To understand the contemporary relevance of Justice Powell’s opinion, 
it is necessary to outline the recent developments in the constitutional principles 
governing affirmative action programs. The Court has now settled on the view 
that affirmative action programs, like all other programs embodying racial 
discrimination, should be subject to “strict scrutiny” from courts, and invalidated 
unless they are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state 
                                                 
373 Id. at 314.  
374 Id. 
375 Id. at 316-320. 
376 Id. at 317.  
377 Id. 
378 This is not the exclusive basis for Justice Powell’s opinion; he was also concerned with what 
will happen after graduation – with the possibility that members of minority groups will serve 
their communities, in a way that confers significant social benefits on populations that might 
otherwise be underserved. Id. For evidence that this does happen, see John Bowen and Derek 
Bok, The Shape of the River (1998). 
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 interest.379 It is also clear that past “societal discrimination,” meaning 
discrimination in the nation’s past, is not a legitimate basis for discrimination 
against whites.380 It is equally clear that narrow, remedial affirmative action 
programs are acceptable if they are specifically designed to correct for proven 
past discrimination by the institution that is acting affirmatively.381  
 
 What remains unclear is when, if ever, a public institution is permitted to 
justify affirmative action by reference to “forward-looking” justifications, not 
involving a remedy for past discrimination.382 A state might, for example, try to 
defend affirmative action in hiring police by urging that a police force will 
simply be more effective if it contains African-Americans among others—
especially in a community that contains people of multiple races.383 Justice Powell 
was really offering a similar claim about higher education: Whether or not a 
college or university has itself discriminated against African-Americans or 
others, it should permitted to discriminate in favor of them if it is doing so as a 
means of ensuring a “robust exchange of ideas.” But current justices have given 
conflicting signals about the legitimacy and strength of forward-looking 
justifications.384  
                                                 
379 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 
US 200 (1995). 
380 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469, 477 (1989). 
381 United States v. Paradise, 480 US 149 (1987); Local No. 93, International Association of 
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 US 616 (1987). 
382 For general discussion, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's 
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 96 (1986): "Public and private employers might 
choose to implement affirmative action for many reasons other than to purge their own past sins 
of discrimination. The Jackson school board, for example, said it had done so in part to improve 
the quality of education in Jackson -- whether by improving black students' performance or by 
dispelling for black and white students alike any idea that white supremacy governs our social 
institutions. Other employers might advance different forward-looking reasons for affirmative 
action: improving their services to black constituencies, averting racial tension over the allocation 
of jobs in a community, or increasing the diversity of a work force, to name but a few examples. 
Or they might adopt affirmative action simply to eliminate from their operations all de facto 
embodiment of a system of racial caste. All of these reasons aspire to a racially integrated future, 
but none reduces to 'racial balancing for its own sake.'" 
383 Id. 
384 For one view, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987) (Stevens, 
concurring): “Instead of retroactively scrutinizing his own or society's possible exclusions of 
minorities in the past to determine the outer limits of a valid affirmative-action program -- or 
indeed, any particular affirmative-action decision -- in many cases the employer will find it more 
appropriate to consider other legitimate reasons to give preferences to members of 
underrepresented groups. Statutes enacted for the benefit of minority groups should not block 
these forward-looking considerations.” For a contrasting view, see Justice O'Connor, in Metro 
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  There can be no doubt that universities are permitted to promote diversity 
and dissent by seeking a mix of faculty and students. Efforts of this kind are 
pervasive; this is what most admissions offices try to do. To be sure, some 
serious free speech issues might be raised if an admissions office discriminates in 
favor of, or against, particular points of view.385 But even if public institutions are 
barred from pursuing diversity of ideas by discriminating directly against some 
points of view, such institutions are surely permitted, without offending the first 
amendment, to seek a variety of backgrounds and experiences, in the hope that 
better discussions will result. If Justice Powell is right, affirmative action 
programs can be similarly justified. The simple idea here is that diverse 
populations are likely to increase the range of thoughts and perspectives, and to 
reduce the risks of conformity, cascades, and polarization associated with group 
influences.386 We have seen that on the judiciary, judges with diverse views can 
act as “whistleblowers,” correcting ill-considered views of the law. In 
educational institutions, a high degree of diversity, including racial diversity, 
often has the same effect. A racially uniform class is all too likely to polarize to an 
unjustified position, simply because students’ antecedent views are not subject to 
critical scrutiny. 
 
  For example, we can easily imagine all-white classrooms, discussing the 
issue of racial profiling, in which the absence of racial diversity is a serious 
problem. Those who have not had bad experiences, as a result of such profiling, 
will lack crucial information. Return here to Justice O’Connor’s comments on 
Justice Marshall: “Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. . . . His was the 
mouth of a man who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. . . . 
                                                                                                                                                 
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 US 547, 612 (1990), joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy: 
“Modern equal protection has recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the 
effects of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is 
clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated 
to any legitimate basis for employing racial classifications.” 
385 I am unaware of any first amendment challenge to a university’s efforts to promote diversity 
by promoting a range of views, even though such efforts would necessarily involve 
discrimination against some views and in favor of others. But there are some hard questions 
lurking here. One set of questions involve the sheer difficulty of proof: In a case in which a 
student is or is not denied admission, the applicant’s political view will undoubtedly be one of a 
range of factors, and it will be hard to isolate, in a challenge, point of view as the decisive factor. 
In a case of discharge or suspension as a result of political view, there would indeed be a 
constitutional problem. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 US 563, 568 (1968). 
386 For supportive evidence, see Patricia Gurin, Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of 
Michigan: the Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 Mich J Race & Law 363 
(1999). 
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 I have been perhaps most personally affected by Justice Marshall as a raconteur . 
. . . Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still catch myself looking expectantly 
for his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just once more, another 
story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.”387 What 
was true for Justice O’Connor is true for white students in many educational 
settings. In the context of racial profiling, and in many other imaginable cases, a 
degree of racial diversity is likely to bring to bear valuable information and 
perspectives. These may change how the group sees the world, whether or not it 
leads to a different conclusion on the merits. 
 
  To say this is of course not to make the absurd claim that white people all 
agree with one another about racial profiling, or that African-Americans have the 
same experiences and opinions about that complex issue. And in light of the fact 
that members of all races contain people with a range of both favorable and 
unfavorable views about racial profiling, it would be possible to respond that 
any problem, if it exists, is not because the group is all-white, but if and because 
its members begin with a uniform view of racial profiling. And if this is so, what, 
if anything, is added by promoting diversity not of views but of racial 
background? The answer must be that African-Americans, by virtue of their 
experience, are able to add something to the discussion as such. And this seems 
far from implausible. If students need to know something about the magnitude 
and the experience of racial profiling, those who have been subject to such 
profiling will be able to offer novel insights. And if African-Americans do, in 
fact, have an unusually high degree of hostility to racial profiling, that is by itself 
a point worthwhile to know and to try to understand. So too if they do not show 
such hostility. Of course supplemental readings could be used to expose people 
to diverse views. The value of diversity lies not simply in learning about facts, 
but also in seeing a range of perspectives, including the emotions attached to 
them—and in being in the actual physical presence of those who have those 
perspectives, and perhaps cannot be easily dismissed. 
 
 These points might be used by a purportedly nondiscriminatory institution 
to defend a set of policies designed to ensure a reasonable diversity of view in 
classroom discussions. Because of the importance of a wide range of ideas to the 
educational enterprise, the goal seems both legitimate and compelling. Are 
affirmative action programs the least restrictive means of promoting that goal? 
The answer depends on the nature of those programs. It is easy to imagine 
                                                 
387 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Reconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 
1217, 1217, 1220 (1992). 
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 cautious efforts, using race as a factor, in which the “least restrictive means” test 
is indeed satisfied.388 And that point is sufficient to suggest that Justice Powell’s 
approach is essentially correct. 
 
 To be sure, the same arguments about the importance of diverse views 
might be enlisted very broadly, and in circumstances that might seem 
unattractive. Imagine, for example, an effort, by a mostly African-American 
university, to point to the need for diversity as a way of defending 
discrimination against African-Americans and in favor of whites. Such a 
university might claim that it wants significant representation by whites in order 
to reduce the risks from group influences and to improve the quality of 
discussion. It does indeed follow, from what I have said thus far, that this 
argument is legitimate. A classroom that is entirely African-American might well 
suffer from conformity effects and polarization; and a educational institution 
might want to correct the situation. If courts should be suspicious of the 
argument in this context, it is because they do not trust the sincerity of those who 
make it. Courts might believe that the reference to diversity is actually a pretext 
for an illicit discriminatory motive. But it is easy to imagine cases in which 
diversity is the real concern and no pretext is involved.  
 
 There is a further complexity. Suppose that a university claims that it is 
pursuing the goal of high-quality education. Suppose that it insists that its 
admissions policies, which place a premium on many forms of diversity, are a 
legitimate means of pursuing that goal. Such a university might well be willing 
to discriminate in favor of members of racial minorities—and might well claim 
that this form of discrimination is part of the neutral pursuit of high-quality 
education. Is this illegitimate? Outside the context of affirmative action, the 
Court has come very close to holding that it is.389 In making decisions about child 
custody, courts are prohibited from taking account of the possible prejudice to be 
faced by children of racially mixed couples. The prohibition applies even if it is 
defended as part of a neutral mechanism for promoting the welfare of the 
child.390 A racially-based system of child custody cannot be justified on the 
ground that in light of existing social values, children do better in a family that is 
all-white or all-African-American. This decision suggests that an institution is not 
permitted to defend otherwise illegitimate discrimination by suggesting that it is 
                                                 
388 This was the conclusion of the court of appeals about the program used by the University of 
Michigan Law School. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). 
389 See Palmore v. Sadoti, 466 US 429 (1984). 
390 See id. 
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 neutrally pursuing a more abstract goal.391 But I am not claiming here that 
affirmative action fails to count as discrimination. I am urging instead that 
affirmative action can be adequately justified, in some contexts, as a way of 
ensuring that educational institutions do what they are supposed to do. 
 
 It is important to emphasize the narrowness of the argument I am making. 
In some cases, racial diversity is important for improving the educational process 
within the relevant school. But in some cases, the claim seems extremely weak. 
Would a mathematics class, or a course in physics, be improved if it contained a 
degree of racial diversity? This seems unlikely. In principle, I do not believe that 
courts should use the Constitution to scrutinize affirmative action programs with 
great care.392 But the law is otherwise, and if courts are going to do so, they 
should not offer a blanket ruling for or against a diversity rationale in higher 
education. They should accept that rationale in the context of undergraduate 
education, but not for programs for which racial diversity is not necessary to 
promote a “robust exchange of ideas.” In the context of law school, the centrality 
of racial issues to important aspects of legal education should be enough to allow 
narrowly tailored affirmative action programs to survive constitutional 
scrutiny.393 
 
Conclusion 
 
Human beings pay close attention to the informational and reputational 
signals sent by others. These signals produce conformity, even in cases in which 
many people have reason to believe, on the basis of their private information, 
that others are mistaken or worse. Informational and reputational influences also 
produce cascades, in which people do not rely on, and fail to disclose, the 
information that they themselves have. Cascades and errors occur spontaneously 
when people rationally take account of the decisions and statements of their 
predecessors. Errors are magnified when people are rewarded for conformity—
and minimized when people are rewarded, not for correct individual decisions, 
but for correct decisions at the group level.  
 
Cascades, like conformity, are not a problem in themselves. Sometimes 
cascades produce good outcomes, at least compared to a situation in which 
                                                 
391 On some of the complexities here, see David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 
Supreme Court Review 99. 
392 See Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2002). 
393 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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 people rely solely on their own information. The real problem is that when 
cascades are occurring, people do not disclose information from which others 
would benefit. The result is that both individuals and groups can blunder, 
sometimes catastrophically. Institutions involved in making, enforcing, and 
interpreting the law are subject to conformity and cascade effects. The executive 
branch has been shown to blunder as a result.394 We have seen that within courts, 
precedential cascades are highly likely, especially in complex areas; and in such 
areas, cascades tend to be both self-perpetuating and self-insulating. 
 
The general lesson is clear. It is extremely important to devise institutions 
that attempt to promote disclosure of private views and private information. 
Institutions that reward conformity are prone to failure to the extent that they do 
not do that; institutions are far more likely to prosper if they create a norm of 
openness and dissent. The point very much bears on the risks of group 
polarization. Groups of like-minded people are likely to go to extremes, simply 
because of limited argument pools and reputational considerations. The danger 
is that the resulting movements in opinion will be unjustified. It is extremely 
important to create “circuit breakers”395 and to devise institutional arrangements 
that will serve to counteract movements that could not be supported if people 
had a wider range of information. 
 
These points have implications for numerous issues in law and policy. I 
have focused on a small subset of those issues here. We have seen that an 
appreciation of social influences casts new light on the expressive function of 
law. Simply by virtue of what it says, and even if it is rarely enforced, law can 
affect the behavior of those who are unsure whether to engage in certain 
conduct—and also the behavior of those who are unsure whether to challenge 
those who engage in that conduct. Bans on smoking in public and on sexual 
harassment are cases in point. Law’s effectiveness, in this regard, lies in its power 
to give a signal about what it is right to do, and also to dissipate pluralistic 
ignorance, by providing information about what other people think that it is 
right to do. A legal enactment can operate in the same fashion as Asch’s 
confederates and Milgram’s experimenter. Because people care about the 
reactions of others, law’s expressive function will be heightened if the relevant 
conduct is visible; bans on smoking in public places are an obvious example. For 
the same reason, that function will be weakened if prospective law-breakers live 
in a supportive subcommunity; consider bans on the use of narcotics. With an 
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395 See Eric Posner, supra note. 
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 understanding of social influences, we can therefore make some predictions 
about when law is likely to be effective merely by virtue of what it says—and 
about when law will be ineffective unless it is accompanied by vigorous 
enforcement activity.  
 
I have suggested that many of the Constitution’s institutions serve to 
reduce the likelihood of bad consequences from conformity, cascades, and group 
polarization. Such institutions increase the likelihood that important information, 
and alternative points of view, will receive a public airing. The system of 
bicameralism is the most obvious example, producing a system in which 
lawmaking is done by two institutions with different cultures, thus creating a 
potential check on unjustified movements. I have also urged that the framers’ 
most distinctive contribution consisted not in their endorsement of deliberative 
democracy, which was uncontroversial, but in their commitment to 
heterogeneity in government, seeing (in Hamilton’s words) the “jarring of 
parties” as a method for “promoting deliberation.”  
 
More controversially, I have suggested that an understanding of social 
influences suggests the importance of ensuring a high degree of diversity on the 
federal bench. It is foolish to pretend that Republican appointees do not, as a 
class, differ from Democratic appointees; and we have reason to appreciate the 
value, on any panel, of having a potential “whistleblower,” in the form of one 
judge of a different party from the other two. Of course judges are rarely lawless, 
but a group of like-minded judges is prone to go to extremes. An appreciation of 
social influences on belief and behavior also supports the legitimacy of efforts to 
promote racial diversity in higher education, at least where such diversity is 
likely to improve learning. 
 
Even if occasionally alarming, much of the behavior discussed here attests 
to the reasonableness and good sense of ordinary people. In the face of doubt, we 
do well to pay attention to the views of others.396 After all, they might know 
better than we do. It is prudent to be cautious about challenging other people, 
not only because they might be right, but also because people do not always like 
to be challenged. Even in the most freedom-loving societies, people dissent at 
their peril. A reluctance to disagree is not merely prudent; it is often courteous 
too. But conformity creates serious dangers. Behavior that is sensible, prudent, 
                                                 
396 Note the suggestion, in Goldstein et al., supra note, at 174, that conformity operates as a 
sensible heuristic, one that often works well but that sometimes misfires, see Henrich et al., supra 
note, at 356–57. 
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 and courteous is likely to lead individuals and societies to blunder, simply 
because people fail to learn about facts or opinions from which they would 
benefit.  
 
It is usual to think that those who conform are serving the general interest 
and that dissenters are antisocial, even selfish. In a way this is true. In some 
settings, conformists strengthen social bonds, whereas dissenters imperil them, 
or at least introduce tension. But in an important respect, the usual thought has 
things backwards. Much of the time, it is in the individual’s interest to follow the 
crowd, but in the social interest for the individual to say and do what he thinks 
best. Well-functioning systems of law and politics take steps to discourage 
conformity and to promote dissent, partly to protect the rights of dissenters, but 
mostly to protect interests of their own. 
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